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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, antenna systems have been designed to achieve reliable wire-
less communication, while the problem of securing that communication from
eavesdropping was left to mathematical cryptography. Recent research into
physical layer encryption shows that jointly designing for reliability and se-
crecy at the physical layer may be a better solution. Physical layer en-
cryption involves techniques that ensure a signal is information-theoretically
secure, meaning that an eavesdropper with infinite time and computational
resources will not be able to decode a message. Such techniques include pur-
posely broadcasting artificial noise, transmitting direction-dependent signals,
and opportunistic communications. This work addresses different methods
for broadcasting artificial noise using fixed arrays, including tradeoffs with
power usage and computational complexity. In addition, a method of produc-
ing direction-dependent distortion using reconfigurable arrays is also shown.
These two methods are combined and shown to be more secure and power-
efficient than either in isolation. An analysis of secrecy rates through mutual
information makes it possible to compare the performance of all the various
secure communication techniques. Simulations with various wireless chan-
nels as well as an experimental test using a fixed and reconfigurable array
are presented.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Cryptographic vs. Information Theoretic Security
The broadcast nature of the wireless channel poses an inherent challenge for
secure communications. Traditionally, the problem of security has been han-
dled through cryptographic techniques, and was separate from the problem
of reliable communication. The cryptographic methods that ensure security
today fall into two categories: asymmetric and symmetric [1]. Symmetric
encryption requires identical keys to be held by the sender and receiver, and
when this condition is met, it is an efficient and simple way to transmit
secure information. In the 1940s, Shannon proved that if the key length is
greater than or equal to the message length, known as a one-time pad encryp-
tion, then it is theoretically impossible for an enemy to decode the message
without the key [2]. Shannon termed this “perfect secrecy.”
The impracticality of this method is that the key must be securely shared
beforehand between the two parties and the key length is equal to the mes-
sage length. Thus, the nature of the message would have to be known at
the time of sharing the keys, so instead the actual message should simply
be exchanged in that secure environment. Because of the need to be able
to communicate securely without the luxury of a private secure channel to
exchange keys, asymmetric encryption, also known as public-key cryptogra-
phy, was developed with a key-exchange framework by Diffie and Hellman in
1976 followed by a practical implementation by Rivest, Shamir, and Adel-
man in 1978 [3, 4]. The public-key method works as follows. Assume the
transmitter known as Alice would like to send a secure message to a receiver
known as Bob without an eavesdropper, Eve, decoding that message. First,
Bob generates a public key and private key and broadcasts his public key
over a public channel. Alice uses Bob’s public key to encode her message
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and transmits the encoded message. Only Bob can decode the message with
his private key, which he did not transmit at all.
Communications today uses a combination of asymmetric encryption to
handle key exchange and symmetric encryption to efficiently encrypt and
decrypt parts of messages with a secure key [1]. However, public-key cryp-
tography is not information theoretically secure like Shannon’s one-time pad.
The public and private keys are mathematically related, but there is no ef-
ficient way of computing the private key from the public key because it
involves factoring the product of two large prime numbers. However, if Eve
has infinite computational resources, determining the private key is possible.
Information theoretic security implies that even with infinite computational
resources, Eve still does not have enough information to break the encryp-
tion. More practical encryption techniques that are information theoretically
secure have been developed and are described in the next section.
1.2 Information Theoretic Security
Research into information theoretic security began with the wiretap chan-
nel model proposed by Wyner [5]. Wyner showed that secure communication
could occur when Eve had a probabilistically worse channel to Alice than did
Bob. Secrecy arose from exploiting the theoretical rate at which Bob and
Eve could decode messages based on their channels, rather than a key-based
encryption scheme. Work in [6] generalized the analysis to two channels of
which Eve’s is not necessarily a degraded version of Bob’s channel, and de-
fined secrecy rate as the difference in channel capacities between Alice and
Bob and Alice and Eve. If this difference is negative, meaning Eve has a
better channel to Alice than does Bob, the secrecy rate is zero. Secrecy ca-
pacity is the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates [7]. Later work showed
that secure communication could occur even when Eve’s channel was statis-
tically better than Bob’s channel, but the rate of this communication may
be too slow to be practical for sending data and only good for symmetric
key exchanges [8]. The initial work on secrecy rates assumed additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, but subsequent analysis on fading chan-
nels also demonstrated secure communication is possible even when Eve has
a better signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) on average [9, 10]. Current information
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theoretic security research falls into one of two branches: secret key agree-
ment and keyless secure communications [7].
1.2.1 Secret Key Agreement
Secret key agreement involves ways that Alice and Bob can generate a com-
mon key for symmetric encryption while only publicly communicating and
not using public-key cryptography. One method proposed is to use the com-
mon channel between Alice and Bob to construct a key. If reciprocity of the
channel is assumed, then Alice and Bob should be able to sense the same
channel magnitude and phase between them, which can be used to mathe-
matically generate a key or transmit information at a low rate [11]. Using
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) antenna arrays allows more than one
channel estimate at a time, increasing the key complexity and security [12].
Experimental results with four-element arrays indicate that a high number
of key bits can be generated with each channel observation [13].
1.2.2 Keyless Secure Communications
Work in keyless communications that is secured using the physical layer
has progressed much, especially in recent years, since Wyner’s initial 1975
paper. Secrecy capacity bounds have been derived for multiple antennas at
the transmitter, receiver, and with collaborating eavesdroppers [14, 15, 16,
17, 18]. These bounds are derived with the unrealistic assumption that the
transmitter knows its channel to Eve, and it was shown that the secrecy
rate can be substantially less than this bound if only the statistics of Eve’s
channels are assumed [17].
Recent research on keyless secure communications involves developing im-
plementable schemes to achieve secrecy capacity. In [19], the authors showed
there exists an achievable secrecy rate for an AWGN main channel and an
arbitrarily better (on average) Rayleigh fading eavesdropper channel by us-
ing Gaussian random codes, artificial noise injection, and power bursting.
Artificial noise injection also was proposed in [16, 17] for security when using
MIMO antennas in the presence of collaborating eavesdroppers. Practical ar-
tificial noise implementations using fixed arrays recently have been proposed
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[20, 21, 22], with MIMO secrecy capacity for the AWGN channel derived in
[23] and minimum guaranteed secrecy capacity for a fading channel found
in [24]. Optimum power allocation between the signal power and artificial
noise power was derived in [25] and later adjusted in [26] to account for
imperfect channel state information (CSI). A very different optimal power
allocation was found in [27], which assumed ordinary finite alphabet modu-
lation schemes instead of a Gaussian alphabet.
Injecting artificial noise is not the only method of actively securing a trans-
mission. Instead, the transmitted constellation can be created by a fixed or
reconfigurable array in such a way that it becomes distorted in directions
other than Bob’s direction. Using a technique called near-field direct antenna
modulation (NFDAM), a parasitic array is used to synthesize a quadrature
amplitude modulation (QAM), which is transmitted undistorted in the de-
sired direction but distorted in other directions [28, 29, 30]. This distortion
makes the signal more difficult to decode in the presence of noise. This ap-
proach is similar to a direction-dependent signaling of [31], in which phase-
shift keying is transmitted by rapid switching between transmit antennas
within an array. By switching antennas instead of changing the phase of the
transmitted signal, the phase shift varies based on the transmit direction. In
a very similar fashion, [32] uses a two-element array with switched discrete
phase shifts. Another spatially dependent signaling technique uses a spread-
ing sequence to randomly shift the phase center of an array to generate a
direction-dependent signal [33], while a technique in [34] uses a multi-feed
Cassegrain antenna in which the sum beam passes an undistorted constella-
tion but the difference beams transmit distorted versions.
These techniques are similar to another direction-dependent signaling tech-
nique called directional modulation (DM). DM can be used with any basic
modulation, such as quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK) or QAM, to pro-
duce a constellation that is undistorted to a desired receiver while distorted
in most other directions, making the signal more difficult to decode by eaves-
droppers. This requires a transmit array, but the receiver may have only a
single element. In [35, 36], DM is used by a phased array to achieve low bit
error rates (BERs) communicating with the desired receiver while enforcing
higher BERs in other line-of-sight (LOS) directions by distorting the trans-
mitted constellation. The same DM technique also was demonstrated in [37]
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with an array of reconfigurable antenna elements. Simulated and experi-
mental results of DM using a phased array are presented in the appendix.
These techniques are consolidated into a single reconfigurable array signal
distortion technique presented here.
1.3 Dissertation Overview
All of the scenarios in this dissertation comparing the secrecy of various
encryption methods assume that the desired receiver and eavesdroppers all
have a single element and a constant channel. This also implies that no
eavesdroppers may move around to find a less distorted message signal. The
transmitter is not aware of the location of the eavesdroppers, but the eaves-
dropper is always assumed to know its channel to the transmitter.
Chapter 2 discusses physical layer security through artificial noise using
fixed arrays. Existing artificial noise algorithms will be contrasted with two
new proposed algorithms that generate artificial noise with lower compu-
tational demands. One of the new algorithms uses additive artificial noise
(AAN) similar to the current algorithms in the literature, while the other uses
multiplicative artificial noise (MAN), which is mathematically different and
has tradeoffs relative to AAN. The metrics of secrecy capacity and mutual
information (MI) for assessing the security of each algorithm are discussed
in detail. Finally, all artificial noise algorithms are compared on a simulated
Rayleigh fading channel for different power allocations between signal and
interference power.
Chapter 3 explains another method for generating artificial noise through
switching a reconfigurable array transmitter, called reconfigurable multiplica-
tive noise (RMN). Tradeoffs of power usage, algorithm complexity, and train-
ing complexity are discussed. Also discussed are methods for choosing the el-
ement configurations to maximize secrecy rate and minimize transmit power.
Chapter 4 details the channel models that are used for performance simula-
tions of the fixed and reconfigurable array algorithms. The statistical model
used is a modified Saleh-Valenzuela channel [38]. In addition, ray tracing
models from urban, indoor, and rural landscapes also are tested. Eaves-
droppers are assumed spread throughout the volume in order to assess the
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likelihood of an eavesdropper decoding a secure message if it is mobile. Sim-
ulation results for the Saleh-Valenzuela and ray-tracing channels for fixed
and reconfigurable array transmitters are given, and the tradeoffs of using
isotropic versus directional transmit elements are assessed. Finally, the effect
of imperfect channel estimation on secrecy is analyzed.
Chapter 5 presents a line-of-sight (LOS) experiment using a four-element
array as either a reconfigurable or fixed array transmitter. QPSK modulation
is transmitted and decoded by a single element receiver positioned at various
angles from the transmitter to simulate either Bob at some desired transmit
angle or Eve at all other angles. The results show the ability of Eve to decode
the signal for various angles and methods of artificial noise generation.
Chapter 6 combines the two main physical encryption methods of AAN
and RMN for the same transmitter. Simulation results over an urban channel
model are presented. These show that combining AAN and RMN provides
increased secrecy than either method alone, and is more power efficient.
Finally, Chapter 7 gives conclusions and ideas for future work.
1.4 Notation
For all mathematical expressions, a lower-case non-bolded variable (a) is a
scalar, a lower-case bold variable (a) is a vector, and an upper-case variable
(A) is a matrix. The complex conjugates of a scalar a and vector a are a∗
and a∗, respectively. The operator > denotes the vector or matrix transpose,
and {·}H is the Hermitian (conjugate transpose) operator. ||a|| is the vector
norm of a. <(·) and =(·) denote the real and imaginary parts of a complex
number.
CN (µ, σ2) denotes a complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean
real and imaginary parts that are independent Gaussian random variables
each with variance σ2/2 and with means of <{µ} and ={µ}, respectively.
log(·) is the natural logarithm and log2 is the base 2 logarithm.
Probability density functions (PDFs) (which are continuous function) are
written f(·) and discrete probability mass functions (PMFs) are written p(·).
I(X;Y ) is the mutual information between X and Y .
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CHAPTER 2
SECRECY WITH FIXED ARRAYS
Even though [6] found there was no rate at which secure communication was
possible if Eve’s channel were statistically better than Bob’s channel, this
does not mean there is nothing that could be done to give Bob’s channel
an artificial advantage. A method proposed in 2005 involves broadcasting
additive artificial noise (AAN) in the nullspace of Bob’s channel, degrading
to various degrees all channels other than Bob’s [20]. It is relatively easy to
analyze this method of artificial noise because it is additive, and a secrecy
capacity can be readily determined given a channel for Bob and Eve. The
mathematical detail and secrecy capacity analysis of current AAN genera-
tion are given in Section 2.1. However, the current method suffers from the
limitations of high computational overhead and lack of peak power control.
Improvements on the artificial noise algorithm that resolve these issues are
given in Section 2.2.
Another means of generating artificial noise has the effect of multiplying
the desired signal by a random variable rather than adding a random variable
to it. Hence, this is termed multiplicative artificial noise (MAN) generation.
The salient points of MAN are that Bob receives an undisturbed signal in
the same manner as with AAN due to channel inversion, and that it is simple
to compute. However, adhering to a maximum transmit power limit is more
complicated than with AAN. Also, there is no closed form expression for
secrecy capacity. These issues are discussed in Section 2.3.
It will be shown in Section 2.3 that MAN has no closed form secrecy
capacity, and in Chapter 3 the same problem will arise for signal distortion
by reconfigurable arrays. Thus, a means of comparing these different methods
of secrecy is desired. Section 2.4 discusses how mutual information (MI) is
calculated and can give a secrecy rate (but not capacity) for any secrecy
technique given channels for Bob and Eve. Finally, Section 2.5 compares
the secrecy performance of AAN and MAN with respect to power allocation
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between the signal and artificial noise. In this section, only simulations using
Rayleigh fading channels will be used, but more advanced channel models
will be given in Chapter 4 and experimental data given in Chapter 5.
2.1 Additive Artificial Noise Generation (AAN)
2.1.1 Implementation
Negi and Goel [24] describe two methods for artificial noise placement: using
multiple antennas and using multiple amplifying relays. This work is con-
cerned with the former method. Let the signals received at time k by Bob
and Eve be respectively given by
zk = h
>xk + nk (2.1)
yk = g
>xk + ek (2.2)
This analysis is concerned only with single antenna receivers for Bob and
Eve, so the received symbols for Bob and Eve, zk and yk, are scalar. The
AWGN received at Bob and Eve respectively are given by nk and ek, with
noise variances σ2n and σ
2
k. The transmitted signal from Alice is xk and h
and g are the channels to Bob and Eve and are vectors because Alice might
have multiple antennas. Assume g and h are slow fading, so we may treat
them as constant in this analysis.
The transmitter computes xk as the sum of a message signal sk and an
artificial noise signal wk:
xk = sk + wk (2.3)
The message signal weights include transmit beamforming:
sk =
h∗
||h||mk (2.4)
where mk is the actual message symbol at time k that is beamformed using
the channel conjugate h∗. In this analysis, we assume Alice has an error-free
estimate of the channel to Bob. The artificial noise wk is chosen so it will be
in the nullspace of Bob:
h>wk = 0 (2.5)
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The artificial noise seen by Eve is given by g>wk. This quantity is unknown
to Alice because Eve’s channel is assumed unknown to Alice and Bob. Alice
then randomly changes wk for each symbol k at the symbol rate so the
artificial noise seen by Eve is not constant and thus Eve cannot simply filter
it by subtracting a constant number from her received signal. It can be noted
that Alice may change artificial noise at a rate less than the symbol rate. If
the rate of change of noise symbols is zero, meaning constant artificial noise,
transmitted constellations will be distorted in different directions but in the
same way each time. This provides a modicum of secrecy and is the method
known as directional modulation described in the Appendix. As the noise
symbol rate of change is increased up to the symbol rate, secrecy increases.
Another way of interpreting AAN is that the message signal is sent on a
fixed beam in the direction of Bob’s channel, while another beam with a null
in the direction of Bob is randomly varied, causing interference to all other
receivers. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 in which the solid beam conveys
the message information from Alice to Bob while another beam shown in
dashes is randomly varied at the symbol rate, and in this case two symbols
are shown.
Generating wk can be done in one of two ways. The first way is to compute
a noise vector in Bob’s nullspace each time. Let vk be a vector of complex
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance σ2v , which should be
equal or near to Bob’s channel power:
σ2v = ||h||2 (2.6)
Then let:
Wk = [vk,h
∗] (2.7)
ωk = Wk(W
H
k Wk)
−1
[
1
0
]
(2.8)
wk =
ωk
||ωk|| (2.9)
Equation (2.8) ensures that the noise is orthogonal to Bob because it is a
solution to:
WHk ωk =
[
vHk
h>
]
ωk =
[
1
0
]
(2.10)
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Alice
Bob
Figure 2.1: AAN example illustrating the signal beamforming (solid, black)
and the patterns created by the random artificial noise weights (dashed, in
color). The artificial noise patterns must have a null in the direction of
Bob’s channel.
This gives two equations:
vHk ωk = 1 (2.11)
and
h>ωk = 0 (2.12)
Equation (2.11) enforces that the norm of the noise weight vector ωk is
one, and Equation (2.12) enforces no noise in the desired receiver’s channel.
Solving for ωk is straightforward from Equation (2.10):
Wk(W
H
k Wk)
−1WHk ωk = Wk(W
H
k Wk)
−1
[
1
0
]
(2.13)
ωk = Wk(W
H
k Wk)
−1
[
1
0
]
(2.14)
This method requires a matrix inversion from Equation (2.8) at the symbol
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rate. Even if the channel is constant over many symbols, the random in-
terference vk must be varied at the symbol rate, making the generation of
artificial noise with this scheme computationally demanding.
The second method for generating wk involves computing a singular value
decomposition (SVD) to obtain an orthonormal basis for the nullspace of
Bob’s channel. The SVD of Bob’s channel h is given by:
h = UΣV H (2.15)
Since h is an Nx1 vector for the N elements of Alice, V is a 1x1 matrix
since it represents the eigenvectors of a single number (hHh) and U is an
NxN matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of hhH . The eigenvalues
corresponding to the columns in U are contained in Σ, and therefore using
linear combinations of the second through last columns of U yields solutions
in the nullspace of h. If B is the orthonormal basis of h that is composed of
the second through last columns of U , then expressed mathematically, taking
linear combinations of this orthonormal basis satisfies:
h>Bvk = 0 (2.16)
Therefore, once an SVD is computed and assuming the channel does not
change, all that need be done is to take linear combinations of the nullspace
vectors, weighted by a randomly changing vector vk in Equation (2.16).
Whether the artificial noise pattern is calculated through a matrix inver-
sion or after an SVD, either method entails nontrivial computational com-
plexity. For N transmit elements, the computational complexity for matrix
inversion is O(N3) while the complexity of an SVD of a vector is O(N2).
While the SVD has the advantage here for lower complexity and because it
need only be performed at the channel fading rate instead of the symbol rate,
both methods are nontrivial to implement in dedicated hardware. The desire
for simpler algorithms for generating artificial noise is part of the motivation
for the algorithms presented in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
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2.1.2 Secrecy Capacity Analysis
Because the total signal from Alice is a summation of the message signal and
the artificial noise, the secrecy capacity analysis is straightforward. Assume
the transmit power scaling is PT . The transmit power is divided between the
message signal power and the artificial noise power, and this will be denoted
by the variable α taking a value between 0 and 1. Assume the message signal
xk is normalized to have unity average power, and Equation (2.9) already
enforces the artificial noise weights to have unity power. The total signal
transmitted by Alice with transmit power proportioned between signal and
artificial noise is given by:√
PTwtot,k =
√
αPT sk +
√
(1− α)PTwk (2.17)
The average total transmit power is always PT . This is proven by:
Ptotal =
∥∥∥√αPT s +√(1− α)PTw∥∥∥2 =
PT
N∑
n=1
((√
α<(sn) +
√
1− α<(wn)
)2
+
(√
α=(sn) +
√
1− α=(wn)
)2)
(2.18)
The time subscripts k are omitted from s and w.
Ptotal = PT
N∑
n=1
(
α(<(sn)2 + =(sn)2) + (1− α)(<(wn)2 + =(wn)2)
)
+
PT
N∑
n=1
(
2
√
α(1− α)(<(sn)<(wn) + =(sn)=(wn))
) (2.19)
Ptotal = PT
(
α ‖s‖2 + (1− α) ‖w‖2)+
PT
(
2
√
α(1− α)
N∑
n=1
(<(sn)<(wn) + =(sn)=(wn))
)
(2.20)
Since s and w are normalized so ‖s‖2 = 1 and ‖w‖2 = 1, Ptotal equals:
Ptotal = PT
(
α + (1− α) + 2
√
α(1− α)
N∑
n=1
(<(sn)<(wn) + =(sn)=(wn))
)
(2.21)
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Ptotal = PT
(
1 + 2
√
α(1− α)
N∑
n=1
(<(sn)<(wn) + =(sn)=(wn))
)
(2.22)
Equations (2.4) and (2.5) imply that:
sHw = 0 (2.23)
Thus, the real part of Equation (2.23) is zero:
N∑
n=1
((<(sn)− j=(sn))(<(wn) + j=(wn))) = 0 (2.24)
where j =
√−1.
N∑
n=1
(<(sn)<(wn) + =(sn)=(wn)) = 0 (2.25)
Equation (2.25) proves that the summation of Equation (2.22) is zero, and
therefore Ptotal = PT .
Substituting this transmitted signal in (2.17) into (2.1), the received signal
at Bob is given by:
zk =
√
αPTh
>sk +
√
(1− α)PTh>wk + nk (2.26)
zk =
√
αPTh
>sk + nk (2.27)
Eve receives the message signal but also artificial noise to some degree de-
pending on her channel:
yk =
√
αPTg
>sk +
√
(1− α)PTg>wk + ek (2.28)
Since the artificial noise is independent of the message signal and the
AWGN, simple expressions for the signal to interference plus noise ratio
(SINR) for Bob and Eve can be created and used to calculate the secrecy
capacity.
SINRBob =
αPTE[|h>sk|2]
σ2n
(2.29)
where E[·] denotes the expectation. From Equation (2.4) and assuming the
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average symbol power is E[|mk|2], Bob’s SINR can be written:
SINRBob =
αPT ||h||2E[|mk|2]
σ2n
(2.30)
Eve’s SINR given her channel g can be similarly computed from Equation
(2.28):
SINREve =
αPTE[|g>sk|2]
(1− α)PTE[|g>wk|2] + σ2e
(2.31)
SINREve =
αPT
∣∣∣g> h∗||h|| ∣∣∣2 E[|mk|2]
(1− α)PTE[|g>wk|2] + σ2e
(2.32)
The secrecy rate, given Bob’s and Eve’s channels h and g, is a function of
α and is given by [22]
Rsec(α) = log2(1 + SINRBob)− log2(1 + SINREve) (2.33)
The secrecy capacity is the best rate over all possible power allocations:
Csec = arg max
α
(Rsec(α)) (2.34)
From comparing Equations (2.30) and (2.32), Bob is likely to have a higher
SINR than Eve even if Eve has a stronger channel. First, transmit beamform-
ing will maximize the signal power through Bob’s channel for a given amount
of power allocated to transmitting the signal, while Eve’s signal power will
be scaled by g> h
∗
|h| , which may or may not be large depending on how similar
Eve’s channel is to Bob’s and the path loss of Eve’s channel. Second, Bob’s
SINR is not impacted by the artificial noise because it is orthogonal to Bob’s
channel. The artificial noise term in Eve’s SINR is E[|g>wk|2], which is an
expectation because the noise is random. The received artificial noise will
increase if Eve’s channel is strong because g will be larger, which increases
both the signal and artificial noise terms. This limits an increase in Eve’s
SINR. Simulations later in this chapter will show how the power allocation
between signal and artificial noise impacts secrecy rates.
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2.1.3 Line-of-sight Performance of AAN
A simple method of assessing the secrecy of AAN is in the line-of-sight (LOS)
channel between the transmit array and a desired receiver or eavesdropper.
The transmit array is assumed to be four isotropic elements that are spaced
half a wavelength apart. The desired receiver is at broadside, while eaves-
droppers are assumed at other azimuthal angles around broadside. The trans-
mit power is set so that the SNR at the desired receiver is 30 dB, meaning
that the noise received by eavesdroppers will be dominated by the artificial
noise of the transmitter. If the eavesdroppers and desired receiver all have
the same channel strength, and the only difference in channels comes from
the phases between the transmit elements and the receivers, then the SINR
at all eavesdroppers and the desired receiver is shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: The effective SINR to an eavesdropper with a LOS channel (no
reflections) to the desired receiver when the four-element transmit array is
communicating to broadside. The transmitter power is set so the SNR at
the desired receiver is 30 dB and artificial noise power varies from -10 dB to
10 dB relative to the signal power, or no artificial noise at all in the case of
transmit beamforming.
The transmitter may send no artificial noise, which is the transmit beam-
forming case also shown in Figure 2.2. In this case, the receive SINR at the
eavesdroppers is governed by the array factor. When more transmit power is
added to create artificial noise, all directions around broadside suffer SINR
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degradation, even within the main lobe. This narrow region of high SINR
around the desired receiver suggests that generating artificial noise also will
degrade the SINR of eavesdroppers in scattering channels. This will be shown
to be the case in Chapter 4.
2.2 Peak-power Limited AAN
The artificial noise method in Section 2.1 suffers from complexity issues in
generating noise in the nullspace of the desired receiver. Furthermore, be-
cause the artificial noise is random, there are instances in which one of the
transmitter weights is very large. The total power used is constant at each
symbol due to the scaling in Equations (2.4) and (2.9), but there is noth-
ing limiting individual element power. A high peak to average power ratio
can be inefficient and demands a high dynamic range on power amplifiers.
One solution to limit the peak element power is to simply reject randomly
generated solutions that have one or more elements above the limit. This
requires recalculating weights which must be done at the symbol rate, and
may prove computationally costly if matrix inversions also are executed at
the symbol rate. Another method of AAN element generation described in
this section allows for peak but not average power constraints, and generates
weights with linear complexity.
Let wk,n be the artificial noise weight at time k for element n of Alice. The
total transmitted signal at time k and element n of Alice is xk,n = sk,n+wk,n.
Again assuming the transmitter Alice has N elements, the constraints to
satisfy are:
1. |√αsk,n +
√
(1− α)wk,n|2 < Pmax for all n from 1 to N (element max-
imum power constraint) .
2. h>wk = 0 (artificial noise in nullspace of Bob).
The algorithm for generating artificial noise weights wk,n goes as follows:
1. wk,1 ∼ CN (0, σ21).
2. wk,n ∼ CN
(
− 1
hn
n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m), σ
2
n
)
for n = 2 to n = N − 1.
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3. wk,N = − 1hN
N−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m).
This algorithm generates a random weight drawn from a zero mean com-
plex Gaussian distribution for one of the elements of Alice. Then all of the
other random weights except one are generated in some order drawn from
complex Gaussian distributions, except that the mean of the distribution is
continually adjusted to keep the sum of the product of weights and Bob’s
channel close to zero, which is Constraint 2. Last, Constraint 2 is satisfied
by the choice of the final weight in Step 3. The elements can be chosen in
any order, but it seems most logical to choose them from lowest to highest
|hn| so the last element is scaled down the most by the 1hN term, avoiding a
high individual element power that might violate the first constraint.
The algorithm will not satisfy Constraint 1 if any sum of element beam-
forming and random weights exceeds the element maximum power constraint.
This will happen with some probability that can be controlled based on the
choice of σ2n. This variance will change as the weights are generated according
to the following formula:
σ2n =
Pmax
3(1−α) − α|h
2
n|
(1−α)||h||2 −
∣∣∣∣ 1hn n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m)
∣∣∣∣2
− log(1− Psuccess) (2.35)
where Psuccess is a lower bound on the probability that all of the weights will
be within the element maximum power constraint. This bound is set by the
transmitter before transmission and is a tradeoff between how often a failure
(and repeat of the algorithm for one symbol time) is tolerated and how many
different values the artificial noise may take.
The variance in Equation (2.35) will be large when Psuccess approaches
zero, due to the denominator approaching zero. When Psuccess approaches
one, the denominator approaches +∞ so the variance decreases toward zero.
This makes sense because if the randomly generated zero mean noise never
should surpass the element power constraints, it should be made very small.
The numerator in Equation (2.35) must be positive or else the variance will
be negative. The first term of the numerator always will be positive while
the second and third always will be negative. If the variance is calculated as
negative in the algorithm, it is simply set to zero, resulting in the interference
weight wk,n set to zero if it is for the first element or set to the average of
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the complex Gaussian in Step 2 of the algorithm for elements 2 to N − 1.
The proof that (2.35) limits the probability of error is as follows. Let:
Psuccess = P
(∣∣√αsk,n +√1− αwk,n∣∣2 < Pmax) (2.36)
Psuccess =
P
∣∣∣∣∣√αsk,n +√1− α
(
CN
(
− 1
hn
n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m), σ
2
n
))∣∣∣∣∣
2
< Pmax

(2.37)
Psuccess =
P
∣∣∣∣∣√αsk,n +√1− α
(
− 1
hn
n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m) + CN
(
0, σ2n
))∣∣∣∣∣
2
< Pmax

(2.38)
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,∣∣∣∣∣√αsk,n +√1− α
(
− 1
hn
n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m) + CN
(
0, σ2n
))∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
3
∣∣√αsk,n∣∣2 +
∣∣∣∣∣√1− α
(
− 1
hn
n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m)
)∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
∣∣√1− αCN (0, σ2n)∣∣2
 (2.39)
Thus,
P
∣∣∣∣∣√αsk,n +√1− α
(
− 1
hn
n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m) + CN
(
0, σ2n
))∣∣∣∣∣
2
< Pmax
 ≥
P
3
∣∣√αsk,n∣∣2 +
∣∣∣∣∣√1− α
(
− 1
hn
n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m)
)∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
∣∣√1− αCN (0, σ2n)∣∣2
 < Pmax
 (2.40)
Substituting Equation (2.40) into Equation (2.38):
Psuccess ≥
P
3
∣∣√αsk,n∣∣2 +
∣∣∣∣∣√1− α
(
− 1
hn
n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m)
)∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
∣∣√1− αCN (0, σ2n)∣∣2
 < Pmax

(2.41)
18
Psuccess ≥
P
∣∣√1− αCN (0, σ2n)∣∣2 < Pmax3 − ∣∣√αsk,n∣∣2 −
∣∣∣∣∣√1− α
(
− 1
hn
n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m)
)∣∣∣∣∣
2
 (2.42)
Psuccess ≥
P
∣∣CN (0, σ2n)∣∣2 < Pmax3(1− α) − α1− α |hn|2||h||2 −
∣∣∣∣∣− 1hn
n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 (2.43)
Since |CN (0, σ2n)|2 is an exponential random variable with mean σ2n, the
expression to the right of the ≥ in Equation (2.43) can be written as the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of an exponential random variable:
Psuccess ≥ 1− exp
−
Pmax
3(1−α) − α1−α |hn|
2
||h||2 −
∣∣∣∣− 1hn n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m)
∣∣∣∣2
σ2n
 (2.44)
Setting σ2n to the expression in (2.35) makes both sides of Equation (2.44)
equal, meaning that using this variance in the algorithm will have a success
rate greater than or equal to Psuccess. For example, if the desired success
probability is Q, then substitution into Equation (2.44) yields:
Psuccess ≥ 1− exp
−
Pmax
3(1−α) − α1−α |hn|
2
||h||2 −
∣∣∣∣− 1hn n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m)
∣∣∣∣2
Pmax
3(1−α)−
α|h2n|
(1−α)||h||2−
∣∣∣∣ 1hn n−1∑
m=1
(hmwk,m)
∣∣∣∣2
− log(1−Q)
 (2.45)
Psuccess ≥ 1− exp (log(1−Q)) (2.46)
Psuccess ≥ 1− (1−Q) (2.47)
Psuccess ≥ Q (2.48)
The fraction of times an element exceeded the element power constraint as
a function of the user-specified probability of failure (1−Psuccess) is shown in
Figure 2.3. Four million trials were run on different Rayleigh fading channels
for each probability of failure. A four-element array was simulated with
maximum element power limit set to one and the beamforming weights were
normalized to have unit power. The fraction of power allocated to artificial
noise (α) was set anywhere from 1% to 99%. The user-specified bound on
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the failure rate proves to be a loose upper bound since the actual failure rate
is an order of magnitude lower.
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Figure 2.3: Fraction of time the peak power-limited AAN algorithm failed
in simulation as a function of the user-specified bound on probability of
failure. Weight generation failed at a rate less than the user-specified
maximum failure rate.
One important note about the peak power-limited AAN algorithm is that
the noise weights are no longer independent complex Gaussian random vari-
ables since the means and variances of the subsequent noise weights depend
on the previous ones. The weights are still initially generated from an initial
random Gaussian and are independent across time. Since the received artifi-
cial noise at an eavesdropper cannot be assumed to be white Gaussian noise,
the mutual information (MI) between the transmitter and the eavesdrop-
per is calculated by generating a large number of constellation points and
calculating the mutual information using that constellation and the method
explained in Section 2.4.2. This calculation assumes the number of possi-
ble constellation points at the eavesdropper is finite, but because there are
still infinite ways the interference can add up and thus infinite constella-
tion points, this calculation is an upper bound of the actual MI between the
transmitter and eavesdropper.
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2.3 Multiplicative Artificial Noise Generation (MAN)
Section 2.2 presented a method of generating AAN with the number of steps
equal to the number of transmitting elements. This was intended to simplify
the computational burden that came from projecting artificial noise onto the
nullspace of the desired channel. This section describes another method to
generate artificial noise that falls into the desired receiver’s nullspace, called
multiplicative artificial noise (MAN). Like the algorithm in Section 2.2, it is
easy to compute; however, it differs mathematically from AAN in that the
signal and artificial noise terms are not a summation but rather a product.
This complicates secrecy capacity analysis and necessitates the alternative
secrecy analysis in Section 2.4. Secrecy performance compared to AAN will
be given in Section 2.5.
Given Alice’s channel to Bob h, Alice computes the weights for MAN as
follows:
xk =
αh∗ + α(1− α)wk
α ‖h‖2 + (1− α)h>wk
mk (2.49)
where mk is the message symbol. Each wk,n in the vector wk is a complex
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and a variance that gives the
random vectors about the same power as the beamforming part of (2.49).
The method used here is to set wk,n ∼ CN (0, ||h||2/N).
The weights accomplish channel inversion so when sent through Bob’s
channel, the result is an undistorted message signal:
h>xk + nk = mk + nk (2.50)
The variable α takes on a value from zero to one depending on the power
dedicated to artificial noise. This is similar to the power distribution in AAN
but not exactly the same. For example, when α = 1, the weights reduce to:
xk =
h∗
‖h‖2mk (2.51)
which is simply transmit beamforming. But as α approaches zero, all weights
approach zero rather than increasing the artificial noise part. This is due to
the α(1−α) term in front of the artificial noise part. Because of this, Equation
(2.49) is the formulation for power-limited MAN.
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If the weights were formulated as
xk =
αh∗ + (1− α)wk
α ‖h‖2 + (1− α)h>wk
mk (2.52)
then for α close to zero, the transmitted signal becomes a random number
multiplied by the message signal. Take the extreme case of α = 0 for the
weights in (2.52). The weights now are:
xk =
wk
h>wk
mk (2.53)
Bob still receives h>xk + nk = mk + nk. An eavesdropper with a channel gk
receives:
g>xk + ek =
g>wk
h>wk
mk + ek (2.54)
The complex scaling of mk in Equation (2.54) randomly varies from symbol
to symbol causing multiplicative random noise. Section 2.5 shows that gen-
erating weights from the expression in (2.52) increases the secrecy at a high
transmit power cost. Thus, Equation (2.52) is the formulation for power-
unlimited MAN.
Because MAN transmits a message mk multiplied by a random complex
number instead of a message signal added to an interference signal, a closed
form expression for SINR and thus a simple secrecy rate formula is not possi-
ble. In fact, this situation is analogous to a wireless fading channel in which
a signal is multiplied by a time-varying random variable. In the case of a
signal that is sent from Alice to Eve in which neither may know the CSI,
determining an expression for channel capacity remains an open problem for
most cases [39]. Instead of comparing rates using a closed form expression,
the signal constellations seen by Bob and Eve can be used, with a few as-
sumptions, to compute the mutual information (MI) between Alice and Bob,
and Alice and Eve. This method for computing the MI is the same as the
method described in Section 2.2 for peak power-limited AAN. Section 2.4
explains how MI is calculated from received constellations and how it will
serve as a metric for the remaining simulations and experimental data.
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2.4 Mutual Information Analysis of Signals
2.4.1 Mutual Information Definitions
The mutual information (MI) between X and Y is the reduction of uncer-
tainty of X given the knowledge of Y [40]. We can designate Y as the received
signal and X as the message transmitted. Given perfect reception of Y , the
MI is equal to the number of bits in X because there is no uncertainty at the
receiver about X when Y is received. More commonly, MI is given as bits
per unit time, and the discrete time MI in bits per channel use will be used
here.
MI is equivalent to the rate of communication because, for a given com-
munication scheme, it equals the rate at which information bits are sent
from Alice to Bob. All channels presented here are assumed to be discrete
memoryless channels, meaning outputs only depend on the inputs at the cur-
rent time. The information capacity, C, of a discrete memoryless channel is
related to MI by [40]:
C = max
p(X)
I(X;Y ) (2.55)
where p(X) is the probability distribution of the input, and the capacity is
taken from the maximum MI taken over all possible input distributions.
For the scenarios considered in this work, the input distribution X will
be discrete, such as QPSK or 16 QAM. The output distribution Y will be
continuous due to the effects of AWGN and artificial noise. If we assume
the transmitter maps an input xk to a received signal g(xk) that includes
the effect of the channel, and AWGN is represented in discrete time by nk,
then let yk = g(xk) + nk be the received signal. This assumes a constant
channel over time and that the transmitter maps the inputs in the same
way each time. This is not the case when the transmitter is implementing
artificial noise or changing antenna configurations as is done in Chapter 3,
but is true for transmit beamforming. Calculating MI for artificial noise or
reconfigurable antenna secrecy will be addressed later. We will omit the time
dependence, so y = g(x) + n. Let the AWGN be zero mean with variance
N0 and let the PMF of the input be p(x), the output PDF be f(y), and the
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joint PDF be denoted by f(x, y). The MI between X and Y is given by:
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x
∫
y
f(x, y) log2
f(x, y)
p(x)f(y)
dy. (2.56)
We assume each symbol has an equal probability of being chosen to be trans-
mitted, p(x) = 1
M
for an M -sized alphabet. From the law of total probability:
f(y) =
M∑
i=1
p(xi)f(y|xi). (2.57)
Since y = g(x) + n, y|x is a complex Gaussian random variable with mean
equal to g(x) and variance equal to the noise variance N0,
f(y|x) = 1
piN0
e
− |y−g(x)|2
N0 . (2.58)
Finally, by the definition of conditional probability,
f(x, y) = p(x)f(y|x). (2.59)
Combining these results and given an M -ary modulation and fixed transmit
array, the MI between the transmitted and received messages is given by:
I(X;Y ) =
M∑
i=1
∫
C
1
MpiN0
e
−|y−g(xi)|
2
N0 log2
 Me−|y−g(xi)|2N0∑M
l=1 e
−|y−g(xl)|
2
N0
 dy
 (2.60)
where the integral of y occurs over the complex plane.
2.4.2 Methods of Calculating Mutual Information
Given a discrete input distribution and a constellation mapping g(x) at the
receiver in the presence of AWGN, Equation (2.60) is one method of calculat-
ing the MI between the transmitter and receiver, and thus the rate at which
error-free communication is possible. The integrand of (2.60) will have peaks
at the locations of the noiseless received constellation points in the com-
plex plane. This makes numerical integration of (2.60) difficult because the
integrand has a high dynamic range of values over which to integrate.
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Another method discussed in [41] involves computing the MI of the input
and output bits rather than symbols. This has two advantages. First, it
is numerically simpler because it involves a one-dimensional integral of a
real-valued function rather than an integral over the complex plane. Second,
it takes into account the bit mapping to symbols, while the symbolic MI
assumes an optimal mapping. It will be shown that for some constellations,
even a Gray coding mapping (in which adjacent symbols differ by only one
bit [39]) yields a lower MI when calculated bit-wise relative to symbol-wise
MI. Gray coding is not optimal because the probability of bit errors is not
equal for each bit of the symbol.
Assuming all message bits are equally likely to be one or zero, the MI is
calculated by:
I(A;B) =
1
2
∑
B∈{0,1}
∫ ∞
−∞
p(a|b) log2
(
2p(a|b)
p(a|b = 0) + p(a|b = 1)
)
da (2.61)
where B are the transmitted bits (zero and one), A are the log-likelihood
ratios of the received bits after symbol decoding, and p(a|b) is the PDF of
the log-likelihood ratio of a received bit given b was sent. The log-likelihood
ratio of a received bit is given by:
L(bˆ) = ln
(
p(bˆ = 1|y)
p(bˆ = 0|y)
)
(2.62)
where ln is the natural logarithm, y is a vector of received symbols, and bˆ is
the estimate of the current bit. Since we are not assuming coded symbols,
the current bit only depends on the current received symbol y, so we can
write:
L(bˆ) =
p(bˆ = 1|y)
p(bˆ = 0|y) (2.63)
The probability that bˆ is a one or zero based on the received symbol y is
given by [42]:
p(bˆ|y) =
∑
x∈B˜
1
piN0
e
− |y−g(x)|2
N0 (2.64)
where B˜ is the set of transmit symbols that have bˆ. For example, if bˆ = 0
and 16 QAM were used and the first bit of the symbol were in question, then
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B˜ might equal {1 + 0j, 0− 1j, . . . ,−1 + 2j} if those symbols correspond to
the bits {0000, 0001, . . . , 0111} since 16 QAM has four bits per symbol.
Additionally, the received symbol y is a random variable that is composed
of an AWGN variable w ∼ CN (0, N0) added to the transmitted symbol. This
transmitted symbol s comes from the set of all possible symbols (denoted S)
with equal probability, so y = s + w, s ∈ S. But if s is conditioned on bit
b sent, then s ∈ S˜, where S˜ is the half of the total symbols that have the
corresponding bit equal to b.
L(bˆ|b) is computed from the received symbols y in the presence of noise
using (2.63) and (2.64). A Monte Carlo simulation generates many bits from
which log-likelihood ratios are computed and compiled into a PDF by taking
a histogram, which is then used in (2.61) to find the MI.
The final step that relates the bit MI in (2.61) to the symbol MI in (2.56)
is to scale the bit MI by the bits per symbol in an M -ary modulation:
I(X;Y ) = log2(M)I(A;B) (2.65)
If the input distribution is independent of time and uniformly distributed,
the resulting MI as a function of SNR is shown in Figure 2.4 for various stan-
dard modulations. These MIs were calculated using both Equation (2.56)
that uses the received symbols and Equation (2.61) that uses the received
bits. The symbol results agree with the independent and uniformly dis-
tributed capacities found in [43].
Generally, the bit-wise MI is very close to the symbol-wise MI. A major
exception is 32 QAM, which has noticeably lower MI when calculated from
the received bit log-likelihoods. This is because there is no method of Gray
coding a 32 QAM constellation. Other higher order modulations such as
64 QAM also suffer lower MI from the bit calculation even though that con-
stellation is Gray coded. This is because even though adjacent constellation
symbols map to bits that differ by only one bit, the probability that each of
the four bits will be in error is not uniform over all symbols. Because of this
non-uniformity, even a Gray code mapping is slightly suboptimal, given a
64 QAM modulation is used. But for practical performance considerations,
it is better to use the bit-wise calculation of MI since it gives a tighter upper
bound on achievable communicate rates when transmitting a Gray coded
constellation.
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Figure 2.4: MI of various modulation schemes calculated from received
symbols and from received Gray coded bits (all Gray coded except
32 QAM).
2.4.3 Relationship between Secrecy Rate and Practical
Security
Before analyzing various physical layer encryption schemes from the stand-
point of MI, this section explains how the difference in MI between Bob and
Eve contributes to security. Even if there is a positive secrecy capacity, mean-
ing the difference between Bob and Eve’s MI is greater than zero, it is not
clear how to best exploit secrecy capacity. The design of codes for secrecy is
still in its infancy [44]. Instead of using a special code, one practical method
is to transmit using a code rate that is greater than the MI of Eve’s channel
while less than that of Bob’s channel. The rate is defined as the number of
message bits per channel use. For example, if the transmitted modulation
scheme is 16 QAM, which has 16 symbols and thus four bits per symbol, and
the rate of the code used is 0.9, then 4× 0.9 = 3.6 message bits are sent per
each symbol transmitted.
Thus, if Bob has an MI greater than 3.6 bits and Eve has an MI less than
3.6 bits due to a worse channel or the addition of artificial noise, then prac-
tical coding schemes will be able to be demodulated by Bob, while Eve will
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have a very low probability of decoding any packets. An example simula-
tion illustrating this result for a code in use today is shown in Figure 2.5.
This figure shows the MI of many different receivers and their corresponding
BER when demodulating a 16 QAM modulation with a rate 0.9 code. The
code used is an LDPC inner code and a BCH outer code (to avoid error
floors), following the framework used by the digital video broadcasting satel-
lite (DVB-S2) system [45]. Because the code is nearly capacity-achieving,
the receivers that had MIs as low as about 3.6 bits were able to demodulate
all of the simulated packets with zero bit errors in the presence of AWGN.
However, as soon as the MI drops below 3.6 bits, the BER grows very quickly
to 0.5 or blind guessing.
Figure 2.5: The relationship of MI between a transmitter sending 16 QAM
and various receivers, and the actual BER of those receivers when using a
rate 0.9 code (implying 3.6 information bits per channel use).
In practice, there are usually fixed coding rates to choose from rather than
a variable rate, so transmitting at the highest rate possible for Bob to reliably
receive the message will ensure that the highest number of eavesdroppers will
be thwarted by physical layer encryption alone.
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2.5 Fixed Array Secrecy Comparison
The secrecy rates and transmit power usage of AAN from Section 2.1, peak
power-limited AAN from Section 2.2, power-limited MAN from Section 2.3,
and power-unlimited MAN from Equation (2.52) are compared in this sec-
tion. Alice is a four-element transmitter and Bob and Eve are single-element
receivers. Weights for various power allocations from all power in transmit
beamforming (α = 0.9) to almost all power in the artificial noise component
(α = 0.1) were calculated, and simulations were carried out on 100 Rayleigh
fading channel realizations for Bob and Eve. It is assumed that the channel is
constant over the time period analyzed. The secrecy rate was calculated from
the difference in MI. The MI was calculated from the received constellation
noise variance method described in the previous section.
Figure 2.6 shows the average secrecy rate of each encryption method as
a function of signal and noise power allocation. All four methods have the
same secrecy rate when α = 1 because all converge to transmit beamforming.
In general in these Rayleigh fading channels in which Bob and Eve have
about equal SNRs, a power allocation that devotes about the same power to
artificial noise as to the signal performs best in terms of secrecy rate for all
four methods.
Much of the difference in secrecy rates among the four methods can be ex-
plained by the average transmit power used by each method, which is shown
in Figure 2.7. The power used was allowed to vary between methods while
the only criterion was that the same-strength signal must be transmitted to
Bob. Because each method produces artificial noise in a slightly different
way, the total transmit power varied. The peak transmit powers are shown
in Figure 2.8. A high transmit power occurs when a random set of artificial
noise weights is large in magnitude.
As mentioned in Section 2.3, the power-unlimited MAN weights tend to
have large peak powers when α is small in Equation (2.52) and most of
the power is devoted to artificial noise. This method can generate weights
especially high in amplitude because the denominator in (2.52) can become
very small when α is small and h>w also is small, but the numerator may
not be small. This differs from the power-limited MAN formula for weights
in (2.49) in which it is very likely that the numerator also will be small when
the denominator is small.
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Figure 2.6: Secrecy rates for the four fixed array encryption algorithms
averaged over 100 channel realizations and for various allocations of power
between pure beamforming (α = 1) and almost entirely artificial noise
(α = 0.1).
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Figure 2.7: Average transmit power of the four fixed array encryption
algorithms for 100 channel realizations, relative to AAN average transmit
power.
Figures 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 show there is a tradeoff between secrecy rate and
peak and average transmit power among these four methods. Where the
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Figure 2.8: Maximum transmit power of each of the four fixed array
encryption algorithms versus beamforming and artificial noise power
allocation.
power-limited MAN transmit power becomes lower than the AAN transmit
power, its secrecy rate also becomes lower than AAN. Peak power-limited
AAN and power-limited MAN methods had lower secrecy rates and transmit
powers in general. Another simulation was carried out to test the perfor-
mance when all methods had the same average transmit power. Again, the
condition of the identical transmitted signal to Bob was enforced, and powers
were adjusted to match that of AAN by adjusting the noise powers of the
other three methods independently of their transmitted signal power. The
results are shown in Figure 2.9.
In this case, the simulation did not repeat the transmit beamforming case
when α = 1 because all four methods converge and have the same average
power and secrecy rate that already is shown in Figure 2.7. When average
transmit power is the same, no method has a secrecy advantage. Both AAN
methods have lower peak powers than the MAN methods.
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Figure 2.9: Left: secrecy rate for the four fixed array encryption algorithms
when the artificial noise component of each is adjusted so all methods have
the same average power. Right: maximum transmit power of each
algorithm when all four have identical average power, as power allocation is
varied between pure noise and pure beamforming.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, four physical layer encryption schemes for fixed transmit
arrays have been described. The original AAN scheme from [20] has high se-
crecy rates in simulations of Rayleigh fading channels, but it has no method
for controlling its peak power level and can be computationally intensive to
implement. The peak-power limited AAN method does not require matrix
inversion to generate its weights, and allows for peak but not average power
control. It performs as well as normal AAN for the same average trans-
mit power in Rayleigh fading channel simulations. The power-limited MAN
method is much simpler than either AAN method for weight generation, but
has a higher peak power for the same average transmit power. The power-
unlimited MAN method can have extremely high peak powers, and both
MAN methods have high peak powers when most of the transmit power is
allocated to artificial noise generation.
In the remainder of this work, the security of the artificial noise methods
will be compared in simulated indoor, outdoor, and urban channel environ-
ments. AAN also will be implemented experimentally. Before that, Chapter
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3 discusses the reconfigurable multiplicative noise (RMN) method that dis-
torts transmitted signals to Eve using an array of reconfigurable elements.
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CHAPTER 3
SECRECY WITH RECONFIGURABLE
ARRAYS
The method presented in this chapter achieves its security benefit differently
from the artificial noise in Chapter 2 in that it foils eavesdroppers by dis-
torting the transmitted signal rather than adding noise to it. By randomly
selecting antenna configurations in the transmitting array at the symbol rate,
a random phase and amplitude multiplies the transmitted symbol. In ef-
fect, the multiplicative randomness seen by eavesdroppers due to switching
is mathematically similar to the multiplicative randomness induced by the
fixed array MAN algorithm. This method of distorting the signal with re-
configurable elements is termed reconfigurable multiplicative noise (RMN).
This multiplicative randomness is compensated by appropriate element
weights so the desired receiver does not experience any random variation and
instead receives one unchanging constellation. Section 3.1 reviews idealized
and real radiation patterns of reconfigurable elements that will be used in
tests of this secrecy algorithm. Then Section 3.2 goes into mathematical
detail on the algorithm used for RMN. Section 3.3 discusses the difference
compared to Chapter 2 in calculating the secrecy rate. Finally, Section 3.4
briefly discusses reconfigurable pattern selection and whether there is a better
way to select patterns than to choose all with equal probability.
3.1 Idealized and Actual Reconfigurable Antenna
Patterns
Reconfigurable antennas are able to change some combination of their oper-
ating frequency or bandwidth, their polarization, or their radiation pattern
[46]. This work focuses solely on pattern reconfigurable antennas, which
come in two varieties: beam-steerable and null-steerable. In order to de-
termine which of the two is more desirable from a security perspective, a
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canonical beam-steering antenna and a canonical null-steering antenna are
tested via simulation. The radiation patterns for one configuration of each
are shown in Figure 3.1. Both have average gains that are normalized to
one and are assumed to have one dominant polarization. The other three
configurations have beams or nulls centered at 90◦, 180◦, and 270◦, so either
element can cover all 360◦ in azimuth in a simulated environment.
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Figure 3.1: One of four possible radiation patterns for an ideal
beam-reconfigurable antenna (left) and ideal null-reconfigurable antenna
(right). The other three configurations have beams or nulls centered at 90◦,
180◦, and 270◦.
In addition to ideal patterns, three actual radiation pattern reconfigurable
antennas are used in simulations (as well as one in the experiment in Chapter
5). The patterns of all configurations for the dominant polarization are shown
in Figure 3.2. To be able to determine which type of pattern performs best,
rather than total performance that includes other factors such as efficiency
and impedance match, all patterns are normalized so their gains are one.
Also, these antennas are designed for different operating frequencies, but in
simulations, all are assumed to operate at the same frequency so the channel
environment is the same and the relative security can be compared.
The first antenna in Figure 3.2 is the reconfigurable microstrip parasitic
array (RMPA) [47]. This antenna has three pattern configurations. The sec-
ond antenna is the broadside to endfire reconfigurable antenna (BERA) [48],
which switches between two patterns. These two antennas are beam-steering
reconfigurable antennas. The final antenna is called the reconfigurable null-
steering antenna (RNSA) [49]. In simulation and experiment, all antennas
35
-20
-10
0
10
0°
30°
60°
90°
120°
150°
±180°
-150°
-120°
-90°
-60°
-30°
-20
-10
0
10
0°
30°
60°
90°
120°
150°
±180°
-150°
-120°
-90°
-60°
-30°
-20
-10
0
10
0°
30°
60°
90°
120°
150°
±180°
-150°
-120°
-90°
-60°
-30°
Figure 3.2: Normalized radiation patterns of all switching configurations for
three reconfigurable antennas: RMPA (left), BERA (center), RNSA (right).
Only the dominant polarization is shown.
will be arrayed and positioned so their patterns shown in Figure 3.2 are in
the azimuthal plane.
3.2 Reconfigurable Multiplicative Noise (RMN)
This section explains how the reconfigurable transmit array (Alice) uses pat-
tern reconfigurability to increase security when transmitting to the desired
receiver (Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve), both of whom are
fixed single element receivers. We assume Alice has learned the channels
from each of her elements to Bob in each of the elements’ states of recon-
figuration. If channel reciprocity is assumed, then Bob need not know the
channel but simply send out a training signal for Alice to use, and then Eve
will not be able to learn her channels to Alice prior to the beginning of the
message. However, if channel reciprocity is not assumed, for example due to
differences in the RF chains on transmit and receive, then through the chan-
nel training between Alice and Bob, Eve can learn her channels to Alice. We
assume the latter scenario for all simulations and experiments.
For each symbol sent, Alice chooses random states of configurations for its
elements. To keep a constant response to Bob and be power efficient, Alice
applies element weights in the manner:
wn(k) =
h∗ABnE
∗
ABn(k)∑
n |hABn|2|E∗ABn(k)|2
m(k) (3.1)
where hABn is the channel from the n
th element of Alice to Bob, EABn(k) is
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the effective pattern from the nth element of Alice to Bob at symbol time
k, and m(k) is the symbol sent at time k. The effective pattern is defined
as the contribution of the radiation pattern in all directions of departure
of significance between Alice and the receiver. Just as the channel might
have multiple paths that contribute to the channel tap, the contribution of
the radiation pattern might be from multiple directions of departure. This
weighting scheme is simply transmit beamforming given the reconfiguration
at time k.
Bob receives:
rB(k) =
∑
n
hABnEABn(k)wn(k) + n(k) = m(k) + n(k) (3.2)
Eve receives:
rE(k) =
∑
n
hAEnEAEn(k)wn(k) + e(k) (3.3)
rE(k) =
∑
n hAEnh
∗
ABnEAEn(k)E
∗
ABn(k)∑
n |hABn|2|EABn(k)|2
m(k) + e(k) (3.4)
where n(k) and e(k) are AWGN at time k at Bob and Eve, respectively.
Thus, Eve has a multiplicative random channel that changes at the symbol
rate, due to the time dependence of the element patterns in the numerator
and denominator of Equation (3.4), which multiplies the message signalm(k).
Like the MAN transmit scheme in Chapter 2, it is not possible to compute
a closed-form expression for capacity, but a bit-wise method can be used
to compute the MI of the RMN transmit technique. The method is not
entirely the same as that used in fixed arrays in Chapter 2 due to a different
assumption about the nature of the noise. The details of computing bit-wise
and symbol-wise MI are given in Section 3.3.
Unlike fixed array secrecy methods, RMN provides some added secrecy
even if Alice has only a single element. When N = 1, Eve receives:
rE(k) = m(k)
hAEh
∗
ABEAE(k)E
∗
AB(k)
|hAB|2|EAB(k)|2 + e(k) (3.5)
rE(k) = m(k)
hAE
hAB
EAE(k)
EAB(k)
+ e(k) (3.6)
Even with a single transmit element, Alice converts Eve’s AWGN channel into
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a multiplicative random channel by randomly reconfiguring at the symbol
rate.
3.3 RMN Secrecy Rate Calculation
Similar to the multiplicative forms of noise generated with fixed arrays, the
secrecy rate of RMN has no closed-form expression. Calculating the differ-
ence in MI from the constellations of Bob and Eve can be done using either
the constellation symbols only, as is explained later in this section, or using
the bit-wise method explained in Section 2.4.2, with a slight modification.
Without AWGN, there are a limited number of unique constellation points
that Eve receives, unlike artificial noise techniques that always generate new
random points. Therefore, it is assumed that Eve knows how each of the
received symbols maps to bits and the sole element of uncertainty is AWGN.
It is not necessary to calculate additional noise based on constellation point
variance around a mean, and the bit-wise method in Section 2.4.2 is employed
using only AWGN to calculate the MI between Alice and Bob or Eve.
One example of constellations transmitted by RMN is shown in Figure 3.3.
These constellations were received in the experiment in Chapter 5. The trans-
mitting array was a two-element array in which each element could configure
two ways, and the modulation scheme was QPSK. The left constellation in
Figure 3.3 seen by Bob has virtually a normal QPSK constellation, aside
from a few errors in phase shifters that will be discussed in Chapter 5. The
constellation on the right seen by an eavesdropper has 16 distinct points due
to the 22 array configurations times the four-symbol constellation.
The formulas for symbol-wise integration to find MI are derived. Although
bit-wise MI calculations are used in this work because of their greater nu-
merical stability, symbol-wise integration should yield the same MI. Given
an M -ary modulation with a reconfigurable transmit array in which each
antenna can reconfigure its radiation pattern in C discrete states, there are
NC different total array patterns that can be produced for an N element
array. If y is the received symbol and x is the transmitted symbol, then the
distribution of y given x is slightly more complex than the fixed array case
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Figure 3.3: Received constellations from the RMN transmission at Alice
(left) and an eavesdropper (right).
in Equation (2.57) and is given by:
f(y|x) =
CN∑
k=1
p(ck)f(y|x, ck), (3.7)
where ck denotes the k
th array configuration. Assume the array reconfigures
in each configuration with uniform probability. Then p(ck) =
1
CN
. Because
the transmitted symbol location is known to all receivers and the only un-
certainty is AWGN,
f(y|x) =
CN∑
k=1
1
CNpiN0
e
−|y−g(x,ck)|
2
N0 , (3.8)
where g(x, ck) maps transmitted symbol x to the received constellation when
the transmit array configuration is ck and N0 is the AWGN power. The MI
between the transmit array and a receiver becomes:
I(X;Y ) =
M∑
i=1
∫
C
CN∑
k=1
{
1
CNMpiN0
e
−|y−g(xi,ck)|
2
N0
}
log2
 M∑CNq=1 e−|y−g(xi,cq)|
2
N0∑M
l=1
∑CN
p=1 e
−|y−g(xl,cp)|
2
N0
 dy (3.9)
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3.4 Radiation Pattern Selection
We have assumed that Alice changes randomly to one of the NC pattern
configurations that an N element array with reconfigurable elements that
configure C different ways can produce. It has been assumed that each of
these configurations is chosen with equal probability. This method will be
tested in simulation and is used in the experimental test. Another method
is to bias the patterns toward those with better channels to Bob. Because
the channels already are known to Alice, she can limit configurations only to
those whose patterns are strongly in the direction of Bob’s channel.
If Alice only configures to the single best pattern, this simply becomes
transmit beamforming. A compromise between transmit beamforming and
equiprobable patterns is to bias toward stronger patterns proportional to the
channel strength. For example, let N = 1 and C = 2, meaning Alice is
a single element that only configures its pattern in two ways. If the first
configuration has twice the SNR to Bob as the second, then Alice will choose
the first configuration on average twice as much. This weighted pattern
selection scheme is tested via simulation in Chapter 4.
3.5 Conclusion
RMN is another physical layer encryption technique that can be used by itself
or combined with artificial noise generation. The latter is demonstrated in
Chapter 6. Its security benefit relies on the distorted received constellation
by Eve to be more difficult to decode in the presence of AWGN than a
normal constellation. Because of this, RMN can be defeated if Eve has
a sufficiently strong channel. However, because the transmitter does not
generate artificial noise, RMN can be more power efficient than AAN or
MAN, but this depends on the antenna radiation patterns. Simulations in
Chapter 4 and an experiment in Chapter 5 compare these tradeoffs between
RMN and artificial noise encryption.
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CHAPTER 4
WIRELESS CHANNEL MODELS
Chapter 4 begins with an explanation of the modified Saleh-Valenzuela chan-
nel model, which is a statistical model similar to a Rayleigh fading channel
but also takes into account individual antenna patterns and angles of arrival
and departure. This is important because different antenna patterns can be
tried with this model, and secrecy of each type of reconfigurable antenna can
be compared. This performance comparison is given in Section 4.2.
Next, Section 4.3 presents channels generated from a ray-tracing program
called Wireless Insite R© [50]. Models from actual indoor, urban, and rural
landscapes are used to generate channels between a transmit array and re-
ceivers spaced throughout the volume of the environment. Channels are
found assuming all rays arrive in a time interval to contribute to a single
channel tap. The performance of each reconfigurable antenna as well as a
fixed array of omnidirectional elements is given in Section 4.4.
Section 4.5 assesses whether using directional antennas offers increased se-
crecy when using AAN, which can use either fixed or reconfigurable transmit
elements. Finally, Section 4.6 analyzes the robustness of AAN and RMN in
the face of imperfect channel state information.
4.1 Modified Saleh-Valenzuela Channel
As opposed to an analytical model such as the Raleigh fading channel model
that was used to evaluate fixed antenna algorithms in Chapter 2, physical
models characterize the channel on the basis of electromagnetic wave propa-
gation [51]. Unlike analytical models, these models take into account antenna
patterns and directions of arrival and departure. This allows for comparisons
of performance between different pattern-reconfigurable antennas.
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The category of physical models can further be subdivided into determinis-
tic models, geometry-based stochastic models, and non-geometric stochastic
models [51]. Deterministic models are completely specified by data com-
puted from a measurement or simulation such as ray tracing. This type of
model will be used in simulations in Section 4.3. Geometry-based stochas-
tic models compute channels from random geometric arrangements, while
non-geometric stochastic models do not use a specific geometry but rather
describe parameters such as direction of arrival and propagation delay based
on probability density functions.
A well-known non-geometric stochastic model is the Saleh-Valenzuela chan-
nel [38]. This model does not take into account antenna pattern but does
describe multipath components with an exponentially decaying probability
distribution. It groups multipath components arriving at the receiver into
clusters that arrive in a Poisson process. The time between the first and last
clusters is governed by an exponential decay. Let τ be the time after the first
arriving cluster of multipath components and γ be the decay constant. Then
only components that arrive when exp(−τ/γ) is greater than some threshold
will be considered in the model. Similarly, within each arriving cluster, the
individual multipath components’ arrival times are also a Poisson process
that is governed by a second decay constant. These individual components
arrive sometime after the arrival cluster time, which is the arrival time of the
first multipath component of that cluster, and no components arrive once
the decay has gone below some threshold.
An extension to the Saleh-Valenzuela model to include antenna patterns
and angles of arrival and departure is proposed in [52]. This is termed the
Saleh-Valenzuela model with angle of arrival (AOA) / angle of departure
(AOD), or SVA model for brevity. Each cluster’s AOA and AOD is de-
termined by some probability distribution, and in the case of this work is
uniformly distributed over all azimuthal angles. The individual multipath
components’ AOAs and AODs are Laplacian distributed around the mean
AOAs and AODs. The antenna radiation patterns are incorporated by mul-
tiplying the pattern value at the AODs for the transmit antennas. The single
receive antennas are assumed to be omnidirectional, and all channel modeling
is assumed to take place in a single plane rather than three dimensions.
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4.2 SVA Channel Performance
Simulated SVA channels were used to assess whether there is a performance
gain from favoring radiation pattern configurations with higher SNRs to the
desired receiver, as specified in Section 3.4. The three measured patterns
and two idealized patterns in Section 3.1 were tested. For each type of an-
tenna, a four-element transmitter was used and channels were simulated to a
single desired receiver and a single eavesdropper, both using omnidirectional
antennas. The RMN algorithm was used to secure a 16 QAM transmitted
signal, and the MI to each receiver was calculated. The transmit power was
scaled so the desired receiver had an MI of 3.7 bits. Fifty antenna configu-
rations were used with the RMN algorithm calculated two ways: either the
50 configurations were taken from all of the possible ways the four-element
transmit array could reconfigure with equal probability, or configurations
were selected with a bias that was linearly proportional to the relative SNR
the combined array pattern gave to the desired receiver.
The results are given in Table 4.1. For all five different antennas, choosing
antenna patterns biased by how well they pointed to the desired receiver
resulted in lower required transmit power relative to an unbiased selection
of antenna patterns, as is expected. Average power was reduced by less
than 1 dB for most cases. The reduction in randomness did not negatively
affect the secrecy. In all five cases, the average MI to the eavesdropper
was lower when pattern choice was not uniformly random. This is because
the reduction in transmit power made up for the cases in which the same
antenna configurations might have been chosen multiple times. Choosing
the same antenna configuration increases the MI to Eve, but the lowered
transmit power makes up for the increase, resulting in a slight total decrease
in average MI to Eve and therefore an increase in the secrecy rate.
4.3 Ray Tracing Channel Models
In this section, the fixed and reconfigurable antenna physical layer encryption
methods are compared for their security in simulated channel environments.
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Table 4.1: Average MI to Eve and average additional power for uniformly
chosen patterns over patterns weighted by desired receiver SNR.
Antenna Eve MI Eve MI Additional
type (uniformly chosen) (pattern biased) power
RMPA 1.7 1.7 0.2 dB
BERA 1.4 1.4 0.3 dB
RNSA 1.3 1.3 0.4 dB
Ideal beam 0.7 0.6 1.1 dB
Ideal null 1.2 1.1 0.3 dB
The channels are generated from models of indoor, outdoor urban, and out-
door rural environments used in Wireless Insite R© ray tracing analysis soft-
ware [50]. As shown in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, the transmitter is a
four-element linear array with half-wavelength spacing placed in the center of
the environments. Examples of the strongest paths from one of the transmit
antennas to a receiver are shown in each figure. The operating frequency
was chosen to be 1.9 GHz. The channel was calculated using ray tracing
and taking the strongest 10 paths to comprise the channel tap from an ele-
ment of the transmitter to one of the receivers. All receivers are vertically
polarized dipoles with gains of one, and are spaced many wavelengths apart
from each other. The transmitters use either a vertically polarized dipole
pattern in the case of fixed array transmission, or one of the reconfigurable
antenna patterns, and the channels incorporating all of these patterns in all
configurations were computed.
The transmitters all used 16 QAM modulation, and it is assumed the data
rate is low enough that narrowband channel assumptions are valid. After
one of the receivers in the volume was designed as the desired receiver, the
transmitter was assumed to have perfect channel information and scaled its
transmit power so the MI between Alice and Bob was 3.7 bits, or equivalently,
Bob always had an SNR of 12.9 dB. All receivers suffer from the same amount
of environmental additive white Gaussian noise. All the other receivers are
designated as eavesdroppers, and their received signals were analyzed while
the transmitter sent a simulated transmission to Bob. Any eavesdropper hav-
ing an MI to Alice greater than 3.7 bits was decided as decoding the message
while those with lower MIs were said not to have decoded the message. The
metric presented in the tables that follow is the percentage of eavesdroppers
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Figure 4.1: Apartment indoor channel environment generated by Wireless
Insite R© with transmit array in center as green boxes and potential desired
receivers or eavesdroppers spaced throughout volume as red boxes. The
four low SNR desired receivers are highlighted with blue circles and the
four medium SNR desired receivers are highlighted with red squares.
Figure 4.2: Office indoor channel environment.
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Figure 4.3: Urban channel environment modeled from part of Bern,
Switzerland.
Figure 4.4: Urban channel environment modeled from part of Rosslyn, Va.
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Figure 4.5: Rural channel environment from plains outside of Boulder, Co.
in a volume who were able to decode the message. This parameter is impor-
tant because it gives an indication of how well a single eavesdropper could
decode a message given freedom to move around in a volume. Also given is
the transmit power for each scheme, relative to the power required for the
fixed dipole array to transmit with an MI of 3.7 bits when using transmit
beamforming.
All five reconfigurable antennas are simulated transmitting with the RMN
encryption scheme. Patterns are chosen randomly with a bias to those with
high SNRs to the desired receiver. A fixed dipole array transmitting with
AAN also is simulated. The α parameter is set at either 1/11, 1/2, or 10/11,
which corresponds to a noise power that is 10 dB greater than the signal
power, equal to the signal power, and 10 dB less than the signal power, re-
spectively. Also tested with the fixed array was the MAN scheme with α equal
to 1/2. The transmit beamforming (TBF) array also used dipole elements
(that are omnidirectional in the azimuthal plane), which is why some recon-
figurable antennas with directional patterns occasionally had lower power
usage. Section 4.5 directly compares TBF and AAN using either isotropic
elements or beam-steering directional elements pointed toward the desired
receiver.
The desired receivers in each simulated environment were chosen as part
of a low or medium SNR group. Four receivers were chosen from each envi-
ronment (except the rural environment in which two were chosen) to be the
desired receivers, but of course not at the same time. The four receivers in
the low SNR group were chosen from the lowest 10% of all receivers, as mea-
sured by the strength of the channels to the transmitters. The four were also
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spread out approximately 90◦ apart from each other, so the reconfigurable
antennas whose radiation patterns tended to be maximum in one direction
would not have an advantage or disadvantage. The same criteria were used
to choose the four desired receivers in the medium SNR group, except they
were chosen from those receivers whose channels were in the middle 10% by
SNR.
4.4 Urban, Indoor, and Rural Channel Performance
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the results of the two indoor environments (an
apartment and an office) shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. In the apartment
environment, transmit beamforming alone is enough to thwart about one-
third of the eavesdroppers when the desired receiver has one of the lowest
channels relative to the rest of the eavesdroppers, and almost 90% of the
eavesdroppers are thwarted when the desired receiver has a channel better
than about half of the eavesdroppers. Performance is worse in both cases in
the office environment. Clearly, transmit beamforming alone is not very re-
liable in ensuring physical layer encryption in these environments, especially
if an eavesdropper can move around and find a stronger channel.
The performance of AAN is highly dependent on the artificial noise power.
When the artificial noise is only 10% of the signal power (α = 10/11), the per-
centage of eavesdroppers in the apartment environment with an MI greater
than the desired receiver decreased from 66% to 15%. The same dramatic
improvement is apparent in the office environment. In highly adverse trans-
mit situations, adding small amounts of artificial noise results in dramatic
improvements in secrecy. However, the noise power must greatly increase in
order to deny all eavesdroppers a greater MI and thus have a positive secrecy
rate in all cases. Even using the same noise power as the signal power left
some eavesdroppers with a higher MI, and only when the noise power was
made 10 times the signal power were there no eavesdroppers in either envi-
ronment with a higher MI. This was true for both the desired receivers with
moderate SNRs and those with low SNRs.
The other fixed antenna scheme, MAN, tended to have high transmit power
no matter the α that was assigned. Only α = 1/2 is reported here. The rea-
son transmit power tended to be high was that some randomly generated
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Table 4.2: Percentage of eavesdroppers able to decode message and relative
average power use for fixed and reconfigurable antenna transmitters in
apartment indoor environment.
Encryption Low SNR Medium SNR
scheme receivers receivers
Transmit 65.9% 10.9%
beamforming 0 dB 0 dB
AAN 0% 0%
(α = 1/11) 10.4 dB 10.4 dB
AAN 1.1% 0.4%
(α = 1/2) 3.0 dB 3.0 dB
AAN 15.2% 3.6%
(α = 10/11) 0.4 dB 0.4 dB
MAN 0% 0%
(α = 1/2) 14.9 dB 15.8 dB
RMN 17.4% 1.8%
(BERA) −2.4 dB −0.8 dB
RMN 18.8% 6.5%
(RMPA) −0.1 dB 4.2 dB
RMN 5.1% 2.2%
(RNSA) 0.1 dB 0.9 dB
RMN 2.2% 0%
(Ideal beam) −0.7 dB −0.6 dB
RMN 5.4% 1.4%
(Ideal null) −0.3 dB −0.1 dB
noise vectors caused the denominator in Equation (2.49) to become very
small, causing large values for the MAN weights. In practice, if these ran-
dom weights exceed some power threshold, they may be discarded and new
weights generated. Because the average MAN power was even higher than
the AAN power with noise 10 dB higher than signal power, the MAN en-
cryption scheme also was able to prevent reception by all eavesdroppers in
both indoor environments.
The performance of the RMN algorithm varied somewhat based on the
reconfigurable antenna used. Most antennas resulted in average transmit
powers near that of transmit beamforming, and some, especially the ideal
beam-steering antenna, resulted in transmit powers less than that of transmit
beamforming. The ideal beam-steering array can achieve a lower power than
that used by transmit beamforming with omnidirectional antennas because
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Table 4.3: Percentage of eavesdroppers able to decode message and relative
average power use for fixed and reconfigurable antenna transmitters in
office indoor environment.
Encryption Low SNR Medium SNR
scheme receivers receivers
Transmit 83.2% 24.7%
beamforming 0 dB 0 dB
AAN 0% 0%
(α = 1/11) 10.4 dB 10.4 dB
AAN 1.8% 0.6%
(α = 1/2) 3.0 dB 3.0 dB
AAN 29.3% 10.1%
(α = 10/11) 0.4 dB 0.4 dB
MAN 0% 0%
(α = 1/2) 14.8 dB 15.3 dB
RMN 32.3% 5.4%
(BERA) −0.5 dB 0.4 dB
RMN 33.8% 8.4%
(RMPA) 0.2 dB 6.2 dB
RMN 15.3% 1.3%
(RNSA) 0.9 dB 2.7 dB
RMN 5.5% 0.5%
(Ideal beam) 0.3 dB −0.1 dB
RMN 21.1% 3.5%
(Ideal null) 0.0 dB 0.0 dB
its directional antennas more often are pointed toward the desired receiver. If
this were comparing the average power of RMN with beam-steering antennas
to the power of transmit beamforming with beam-steering antennas that are
fixed pointed toward the desired receiver, the transmit beamforming power
would always be less. As mentioned earlier, the average gain of all antenna
patterns was normalized to one, so only the radiation pattern shape – and not
antenna efficiency – could be a factor influencing secrecy performance. The
patterns were normalized in the azimuthal plane only because the pattern-
reconfigurable antennas were only measured in one cut-plane rather than
three-dimensional radiation patterns. Thus, a full three-dimensional model
with radiation patterns is a topic for future work.
In some cases, notably the RMPA antenna when communicating to the
medium SNR group, transmit power was significantly higher than the other
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RMN cases. This is because the RMPA’s pattern is limited in its directional
coverage, even with reconfiguring. Even though the receivers were chosen
from four different directions, it is likely that one of the desired receivers was
located in a direction close to nulls for all of the RMPA antennas, resulting
in increased transmit power to achieve the required MI to that receiver.
Performance of AAN, MAN, and RMN in the two urban environments,
Rosslyn, Va, and Bern, Switzerland, is shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. It is
more difficult in these environments to transmit securely to both the low
SNR and medium SNR receivers, as evidenced by the fact that about 95% of
eavesdroppers in both environments have a better MI than the low SNR de-
sired receiver when transmit beamforming is used. The urban environments
are more challenging because there is a wider range of SNRs between the
channels of highest and lowest receiver. For example, in the case of the Bern
environment, the difference between the highest and lowest channel SNRs
(not including antenna patterns) is 128 dB, while the difference between
highest and lowest SNR is 33 dB in the apartment environment.
As with the indoor channel case, adding a small amount of noise with AAN
initially produces great returns. Adding artificial noise with power −10 dB
of the signal power reduced the number of eavesdroppers with a higher MI
by 25% in the case of the low SNR receivers in the Bern channel and by
67% in the Rosslyn channel. However, the artificial noise power additionally
required to achieve a positive secrecy rate between the desired receiver and
all eavesdroppers is considerably higher. Even when using AAN with noise
10 dB higher than the signal power, some eavesdroppers had a higher MI. In
one case when transmitting MAN to the medium SNR desired receivers, all
eavesdroppers were forced to have a lower MI. In this case, the MAN transmit
scheme required 21.6 dB more power than transmit beamforming, illustrating
how much power must be expended by any physical layer encryption scheme
for total security.
The RMN encryption schemes that use real-world antenna patterns tend
to be highly variable in the required amount of transmit power and the
secrecy provided. For example, when transmitting to low SNR receivers in
the BERN environment, the RMPA antennas required on average 17.6 dB
more power than transmit beamforming while the RNSA antennas required
3.0 dB less. Both transmit arrays achieved approximately the same level of
secrecy. This can be explained by the limited paths in urban environments.
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Table 4.4: Percentage of eavesdroppers able to decode message and relative
average power use for fixed and reconfigurable antenna transmitters in Bern
urban environment.
Encryption Low SNR Medium SNR
scheme receivers receivers
Transmit 95.5% 41.1%
beamforming 0 dB 0 dB
AAN 5.0% 1.9%
(α = 1/11) 10.4 dB 10.4 dB
AAN 32.6% 5.8%
(α = 1/2) 3.0 dB 3.0 dB
AAN 71.2% 19.5%
(α = 10/11) 0.4 dB 0.4 dB
MAN 2.8% 0.4%
(α = 1/2) 14.6 dB 15.7 dB
RMN 84.8% 23.2%
(BERA) 11.8 dB −1.0 dB
RMN 84.9% 36.8%
(RMPA) 17.6 dB 10.7 dB
RMN 83.5% 19.0%
(RNSA) −3.0 dB 1.3 dB
RMN 62.6% 17.1%
(Ideal beam) −2.6 dB −0.6 dB
RMN 89.8% 24.4%
(Ideal null) −0.2 dB 0.0 dB
As compared to the indoor environment in which rays could pass through
walls with attenuation, the simulated channels in the urban environments
assumed rays passing through buildings would be attenuated much more
than those rays taking an entirely outdoor path bouncing off of buildings, so
the rays going indoors were neglected. Because of this, the transmit arrays
placed on a narrow street in between tall buildings had limited angles of
departure to the desired receivers, even though the desired receivers may
have been located in different directions. The real-world patterns had angles
at which no configurations radiated significant power, and this resulted in
great power differences between the antenna types.
The ideal beam and null antenna arrays had less dramatic power differences
because they were designed to have four configurations, one for each 90◦
sector. The beam-steering array generally had the lowest average transmit
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Table 4.5: Percentage of eavesdroppers able to decode message and relative
average power use for fixed and reconfigurable antenna transmitters in
Rosslyn urban environment.
Encryption Low SNR Medium SNR
scheme receivers receivers
Transmit 94.5% 40.9%
beamforming 0 dB 0 dB
AAN 0.5% 0.1%
(α = 1/11) 10.4 dB 10.4 dB
AAN 6.8% 0.7%
(α = 1/2) 3.0 dB 3.0 dB
AAN 30.9% 14.7%
(α = 10/11) 0.4 dB 0.4 dB
MAN 0.2% 0%
(α = 1/2) 20.1 dB 21.4 dB
RMN 84.4% 26.0%
(BERA) −0.4 dB 1.2 dB
RMN 74.3% 19.5%
(RMPA) 13.6 dB 0.4 dB
RMN 80.8% 20.3%
(RNSA) −3.3 dB 3.0 dB
RMN 58.4% 12.0%
(Ideal beam) 0.4 dB 1.3 dB
RMN 82.2% 21.8%
(Ideal null) 0.2 dB 0.3 dB
power of any transmit array and foiled more eavesdroppers than any other
encryption scheme using similar power levels. This is consistent with the
beam-steering array’s performance in the indoor channel environments.
The final environment simulated was a rural landscape with no buildings
shown in Figure 4.5, and the results are given in Table 4.6. The rural channel
had very few possible paths from transmitter to receiver except a direct LOS
path and a path with a single ground bounce. Because of this, the most
directive antennas tended to greatly outperform the omnidirectional antennas
from a power efficiency perspective. The ideal beam-steering transmit array
used almost 10 dB less power than the omnidirectional fixed array employing
AAN with high artificial noise, and the beam-steering array still was able to
foil more eavesdroppers in the case of medium SNR desired receivers.
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Table 4.6: Percentage of eavesdroppers able to decode message and relative
average power use for fixed and reconfigurable antenna transmitters in rural
environment.
Encryption Low SNR Medium SNR
scheme receivers receivers
Transmit 84.7% 26.4%
beamforming 0 dB 0 dB
AAN 6.9% 2.8%
(α = 1/11) 10.4 dB 10.4 dB
AAN 34.7% 5.6%
(α = 1/2) 3.0 dB 3.0 dB
AAN 70.8% 15.3%
(α = 10/11) 0.4 dB 0.4 dB
MAN 5.6% 0%
(α = 1/2) 14.4 dB 17.5 dB
RMN 43.1% 11.1%
(BERA) 1.5 dB 0.6 dB
RMN 20.8% 4.2%
(RMPA) 22.8 dB 16.3 dB
RMN 55.6% 13.9%
(RNSA) −3.0 dB −2.8 dB
RMN 18.1% 1.4%
(Ideal beam) 1.4 dB 1.3 dB
RMN 55.6% 9.7%
(Ideal null) 0.3 dB 0.3 dB
4.5 Directional vs. Isotropic Transmit Antennas
While the RMN encryption scheme requires antennas that can change their
radiation patterns, and therefore cannot be isotropic, the AAN scheme allows
for either directional or isotropic antennas. The four possible patterns of an
ideal beam-steering antenna that was used in previous RMN simulations in
this chapter are shown in Figure 4.6 and are compared to four isotropic
antenna elements. Simulations using AAN were run in one indoor wireless
environment (Figure 4.1) and one outdoor urban environment (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.7 shows the additional percent of eavesdroppers that were pre-
vented from reception when directional transmit antennas are used instead
of isotropic. Directional antennas have a major impact when there is no
artificial noise transmitted. Anywhere from about 5% to almost 40% of the
total eavesdroppers were able to decode the packets when the transmitter had
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Figure 4.6: The four possible radiation patterns for an ideal
beam-reconfigurable antenna element in the azimuthal plane (vertical
polarization only). Average gain is normalized to 0 dBi.
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Figure 4.7: The percent of additional eavesdroppers that are not able to
decode the signal when the transmit elements have the directive patterns
shown in Figure 4.6 instead of isotropic.
isotropic antennas while not being able to decode when the transmitter used
directional antennas. However, the benefit diminished with levels of artificial
noise comparable to the signal power or higher. There were even instances
when an isotropic transmit array allowed fewer eavesdroppers to decode the
signal than did the reconfigurable array. This occurred because the recon-
figurable array elements have four fixed patterns from which to choose. In
some instances, the best configuration to the desired receiver also strengthens
the channels of eavesdroppers even more than if the antenna elements were
isotropic and all beamforming was done digitally.
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4.6 Performance under Noisy Channel Estimates
A continuing assumption for all simulations so far is that the channel esti-
mate has been error-free. In practical scenarios, there is always noise in the
estimate of the channel at the transmitter or receiver. An incorrect channel
estimate by the transmitter can severely impact secrecy performance because
the artificial noise transmitted will no longer be in the nullspace of the desired
receiver. Work in [26] attempts to mitigate this consequence of imperfect
channel state information (CSI) by proposing several algorithms in which
Alice and Bob communicate to better their estimates of the channel. This
results in Alice allocating vanishingly small power to artificial noise when CSI
uncertainty is high, but even a little artificial noise made dramatic improve-
ments in the secrecy rate. This agrees with the simulation results shown in
Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, where the addition of some artificial noise
and a slight increase in transmit power resulted in far fewer eavesdroppers
able to decode the message versus transmit beamforming. Further work on
imperfect CSI algorithms in [53] proposed algorithms that could mitigate
moderate CSI estimation errors, if the statistics of the estimation errors were
assumed known.
In this section, Alice’s estimate of the channel is corrupted by AWGN of
some power level relative to the channel from Alice to Bob. The indoor office
environment from Figure 4.2 is used for simulations, and the desired receivers
are the four with medium SNRs relative to eavesdropper SNRs. Figure 4.8
shows the effective SINR of one of the desired receivers under imperfect
channel estimates from various encryption schemes. The effective SINRs are
plotted as a function of the noise in the channel estimate, expressed as a
ratio of the noise power (σ2∆h) to the channel strength for the four-element
fixed array channel (σ2h). Artificial noise with powers of −10 dB, 0 dB, and
10 dB, relative to signal power, were analyzed. The RMN case that was
analyzed used a four-element array of ideal beam-reconfigurable antennas.
Because this requires channel estimates for each antenna configuration, these
estimates also were corrupted with the same noise power levels as for the
fixed array. Also analyzed was the AAN encryption scheme with equal signal
and artificial noise power combined with the RMN scheme. This AANRMN
algorithm is explained in detail in Chapter 6.
56
-10 -5 0
-5
0
5
10
15
Channel perturbation relative to channel power σ
2
∆ h
/σ
2
h
 [dB]
E
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
 S
IN
R
 t
o
 B
o
b
 [
d
B
]
 
 
AAN α=10/11
RMN
AAN
α=1/2
AAN α=1/2
& RMN
-∞
AAN α=1/11
Figure 4.8: The average effective SINR of one of the four medium SNR
desired receivers with noise in the channel estimates. The ratio of noise in
the channel estimate to the channel strength (σ2∆h/σ
2
h) goes from 0 (no
noise) to 1 (0 dB). RMN encryption with beam-steering antennas and AAN
with low artificial noise (α = 10/11), equal noise (α = 1/2), and high
artificial noise (α = 1/11) are simulated. Also simulated is combined
AANRMN with equal signal and artificial noise power.
One hundred simulations of noisy channel estimates and subsequent trans-
mission to the desired receiver were carried out. Both AAN and RMN suffer
in SINR performance when their channel estimates become noisy. This de-
crease in SINR at the desired receiver can be crucial if the SINR goes below
the minimum threshold for a given code rate, and thus Bob no longer can
decode the message. As expected, more artificial noise power at the transmit-
ter causes a lower received SINR because some of that artificial noise is now
sent through Bob’s channel. In the case in Figure 4.8 in which the artificial
noise power is 10 dB greater than the signal power (α = 1/11), even a little
noise in the CSI estimate with one-tenth the power of the channel to Bob
dramatically reduced the SINR to Bob by about 7 dB. The combined AAN-
RMN algorithm suffers from the effects of noise more than either individual
algorithm because the erroneous channel estimate causes both artificial noise
to be transmitted to Bob (AAN’s problem) and Alice’s transmit antennas to
no longer beamform perfectly (RMN’s problem).
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The RMN encryption scheme was then compared to the AAN scheme with
equal artificial noise power to signal power (α = 1/2) over all four desired
receivers. The resulting effective SINRs are shown in Figure 4.9. The SINRs
were slightly less degraded by noise when using the RMN scheme versus
AAN. This is because RMN is biased to use the stronger channels more often,
meaning it leverages its directive antennas to be pointing more often in the
direction of the desired receiver. Even though the average channel power to
the desired receiver of the beam-steering antennas over all configurations is
approximately the same as the omnidirectional antenna power, RMN uses
its better channels more often and therefore the noise has a slightly smaller
impact on the channel estimate.
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Figure 4.9: The average effective SINR of all four medium SNR desired
receivers with noise in the channel estimates. The ratio of noise in the
channel estimate to the channel strength (σ2∆h/σ
2
h) goes from 0 (no noise) to
1 (0 dB). RMN encryption with beam-steering antennas, AAN with equal
noise to signal power (α = 1/2), and the two algorithms combined are
simulated.
This slight advantage for RMN in effective SINR results in significantly
increased security. The MI between Alice and each Eve for all trials and
all desired receivers was calculated for the two schemes. The percentage
of eavesdroppers having an MI greater than 3.7 bits, the threshold used in
the previous simulations in this chapter, did not change with increasing CSI
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estimation errors. This is because Bob’s channel does not determine how
well the average eavesdropper receives the signal, so a slight change in Bob’s
channel neither increases nor decreases the performance of the eavesdroppers.
In this particular case, the percentage of eavesdroppers with MIs greater than
3.7 bits ranged from 0% to 0.7%, and there was no trend with increasing
channel estimation error, nor were there significant differences between RMN
and AAN transmission.
However, the difference in secrecy performance is evident when comparing
how often there is a positive secrecy rate. Because Bob’s MI will be affected
by the decreased SINR, it makes sense to compare how many eavesdroppers
have an MI greater than Bob’s MI rather than greater than the fixed 3.7 bits
benchmark. When an eavesdropper has a higher MI than Bob, there is
no rate at which secure communication is possible. Bob’s MI will be less
than 3.7 bits when his effective SINR goes lower than 12.9 dB. Figure 4.10
shows the average number of eavesdroppers that had MIs greater than Bob’s
MI as a function of channel estimation error. As the channel estimation
error becomes significant, there are about twice as many eavesdroppers that
have a higher MI than Bob from the AAN encryption than from the RMN
encryption.
The combined AANRMN scheme allows fewer eavesdroppers to gain a
higher MI than Bob’s MI despite the fact that Bob’s MI is degraded by im-
perfect CSI using the AANRMN scheme more than either AAN or RMN
alone. It is shown in Chapter 6 that AANRMN provides more secrecy than
either encryption scheme on its own, and therefore the eavesdroppers have
lower MIs to start. Therefore Bob can tolerate a lower MI than with AAN
or RMN alone and still have a positive secrecy rate compared to most eaves-
droppers.
AAN and RMN encryption performed surprisingly similarly considering
they transmit artificial noise in entirely different ways. Slight errors in the
channel estimate to Bob significantly lowered Bob’s receive SINR. This can
be mitigated using AAN encryption because the amount of artificial noise
power transmitted can be controlled, but lowering the artificial noise allows
more eavesdroppers to decode the confidential message. While some work
already has been done to determine the optimal artificial noise power level
under imperfect channel estimates and under certain assumptions, a more
general power allocation for AAN and a derivation of the power allocation
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Figure 4.10: The percentage of eavesdroppers who are able to decode a
signal intended for one of the four medium SNR receivers in the office
channel. Either AAN or RMN encryption is used with noisy channel
estimates that range from zero noise to noise power of the estimate equal to
the channel power.
for RMN are topics for future work.
4.7 Conclusion
Several conclusions can be drawn from the simulations in this chapter. First,
it is better to select patterns for RMN encryption with a bias toward those
that direct more radiation toward the desired receiver. Although this may
reduce the randomness that prevents eavesdroppers from easily decoding
constellations they receive, it is compensated by the fact that those eaves-
droppers now receive a signal with lower average power, and therefore AWGN
also thwarts their attempts to decode the message.
Second, in all simulated wireless channel environments, it was seemingly
possible to communicate with a randomly selected receiver while preventing
all other eavesdroppers in the volume from receiving the same or better MI
using physical layer encryption alone. Of course, this assumes all receivers
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were alike, and the eavesdroppers had no special advantages such as direc-
tional antennas or the ability to collaborate. The surest way to achieve a
positive secrecy rate between the desired receiver and any eavesdropper was
to increase artificial noise power, which was demonstrated in the AAN and
MAN techniques’ results. The required noise power for all positive secrecy
rates was very high, often more than 20 dB higher than the power to simply
transmit to the desired receiver without any physical layer encryption.
Third, RMN encryption is a viable alternative to artificial noise meth-
ods because it can achieve comparable rates of secrecy while often requiring
much less transmit power. The best type of pattern reconfigurable antenna
as judged by fractions of eavesdroppers foiled and power efficiency was the
ideal beam-steering antenna. The real-world pattern antenna performance
was highly variable because there were transmit angles at which no pattern
configuration had a high intensity. Thus, an important design goal when
using RMN with pattern reconfigurable antennas is to assure good pattern
coverage over the entire set of possible transmit angles for at least one of
the radiation pattern reconfigurations. The ideal beam-steering array out-
performed the ideal null-steering antenna in almost every scenario. Thus,
the other design principle is that it is better to use a beam-reconfigurable
antenna than a null-reconfigurable antenna for this type of physical layer
encryption. This makes intuitive sense because in the limit as the beam re-
configurable antenna becomes more and more directive, as long as it can still
point to the desired receiver, the power levels to all other eavesdroppers can
be further reduced. In the extreme case, a highly directive beam assures vir-
tually all other eavesdroppers have a lower MI, solely because their channels
are different from that of the desired receiver.
Chapter 5 experimentally compares transmit beamforming, AAN, and
RMN using a BERA transmitting array in a purely LOS environment. Chap-
ter 6 shows the simulated performance when combining AAN and RMN into
a single encryption scheme.
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CHAPTER 5
FIXED AND RECONFIGURABLE ARRAY
SECRECY TEST
An experimental test of AAN and RMN techniques is presented in this chap-
ter. A four-element array of reconfigurable BERA elements is used as the
transmitter. If wired with radio-frequency microelectromechanical switches
(RF MEMS), each element can either configure to a broadside or endfire ra-
diation pattern, but elements are hardwired for proof of concept with two
of the four in broadside mode and the other two in endfire mode. For AAN
transmission, two elements are chosen that are broadside mode, while RMN
is implemented by using two of the four elements to simulate two elements
that change between endfire and broadside. A desired receiver is located in
a LOS channel from the transmit array, and eavesdroppers are located in
other directions also with LOS channels of approximately the same signal
strength. A more detailed experimental setup is given in Section 5.1 and
secrecy results are given in 5.2.
5.1 Experimental Setup
The transmit array is a four-element linear array of broadside to endfire
reconfigurable antennas (BERA) [48]. They are spaced one-half wavelength
apart at their operating frequency of 6.9 GHz. The first and third elements
are hardwired to broadside mode and the second and fourth elements are
hardwired to endfire mode. The dominant polarization is horizontal (yˆ),
shown in Figure 5.1. The array is located inside an anechoic chamber, and
the receiving standard gain horn is used as both the desired antenna and
eavesdropper. The array rotates in the xy (azimuthal) plane as well, and
thus the desired receiver and eavesdroppers are level with the transmit array
in this plane. The measured active element patterns of all elements at the
operating frequency and dominant polarization are shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.1: Transmit array dominant polarization is horizontal (yˆ) and
eavesdroppers and desired receiver are level with the transmit array in the
azimuthal (xy) plane.
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Figure 5.2: Active element patterns of all four transmit elements configured
in either broadside or endfire mode.
5.1.1 Transmit Beamforming Experimental Setup
Three different transmit methods are evaluated: simple transmit beam-
forming, AAN, and RMN. The transmit beamforming experimental setup
is shown in Figure 5.3. Only elements B1 and B2 are used, and the other
two elements are prevented from radiating by configuring the phase shifters
behind them into high isolation states. The signal transmitted is QPSK
modulated at 200 kbps. The reason for the low bit rate and the reason
that a higher order modulation is not used is the phase shifters provide the
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modulation rather than it being generated in baseband, due to hardware con-
straints. The phase shifters are 5 bit digital phase shifters with 360◦ of phase
that are controlled by a computer. The computer cannot switch the phase
shifters faster than 100,000 times per second due to limits on the operating
system. A higher order modulation is not possible because the signal must
be constant in amplitude because of control only of the phase. The signal
generator shown in Figure 5.3 generates a 6.9 GHz CW signal, which then
becomes modulated QPSK by the phase shifters before entering the antenna
elements.
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Figure 5.3: Experimental setup for transmitting RMN and transmit
beamforming. The latter only uses elements B1 and B2.
The desired receiver is arbitrarily designated to be 40◦ from the transmit
array broadside. The total radiation pattern of the two broadside elements
when both phase shifters provide 0◦ phase and when the two-element array is
steered to the desired receiver is shown in Figure 5.4. The pattern maximum
when steered to 40◦ is closer to 30◦ due to phase quantization error as well
as variations in the insertion loss of the phase shifters. The insertion loss
was noticed to vary over 3 dB when the phase shifters were configured to
various modes. Also, the phase error of the digital phase shifters was as high
as 20◦, meaning that a phase shifter directed to 180◦ may only provide 160◦
of phase. It was decided not to correct for these errors because they would
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similarly affect AAN and RMN transmissions and be difficult to correct in
those two schemes.
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Figure 5.4: Total radiation pattern of elements B1 and B2 when steered
toward broadside and toward 40◦. The pattern maximum is closer to 30◦
due to amplitude variations in the phase shifters as well as phase
quantization error.
Once the transmitted signal was received by the standard gain horn acting
as the desired receiver or an eavesdropper, depending on the rotation of
the transmit array to 40◦ for the desired receiver or another angle for an
eavesdropper, it was downconverted and digitized. The receiver is locked to
the 6.9 GHz frequency by a reference signal from the signal generator so a
phase-lock loop is not necessary. A method of synchronizing the symbol rate
is necessary, however, because the symbol rate is generated by a computer
connected to the phase shifters and not locked to the receiver. The method
implemented was to oversample the signal by a factor of four and use a delay
lock loop to continually adjust the best sampling point.
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5.1.2 Reconfigurable Multiplicative Noise Transmission
Experimental Setup
Figure 5.3 also depicts the experimental setup for RMN transmission. In
contrast to the transmit beamforming setup, RMN uses all four elements
but only two at a time. One element from B1 and E1 and one from B2 and
E2 is chosen randomly. The other two elements are turned off by their phase
shifters. This mimics the effect of using two elements that are reconfigurable
between broadside and endfire, with the only difference being a phase off-
set from switching between the adjacent hard-wired broadside and endfire
elements.
Phase shifts of the two transmitting elements are chosen to give the same
amplitude signal in the desired direction, and the proper phase according
to the current QPSK symbol. For the desired transmit angle of 40◦, the
corresponding phase shifts are given in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Phase shifts necessary to give a zero phase response toward the
desired receiver with all four RMN element combinations, and the
measured normalized amplitude and phase response.
Elt. combo. 1st elt. phase 2nd elt. phase Amplitude Phase
B1 B2 −142◦ 17◦ 0.5 dB 10◦
B1 E2 −76◦ −60◦ 0.2 dB −5◦
E1 B2 −155◦ −2◦ 0.2 dB −2◦
E1 E2 −111◦ −58◦ −0.8 dB −2◦
At the symbol rate, one of the four element combinations from Table 5.1
is randomly chosen with equal probability. The phase shifters corresponding
to those elements are set to the phases in Table 5.1 added to the phase of the
current QPSK symbol, quantized to the nearest 5.625◦ because 5 bit phase
shifters are used.
5.1.3 Additive Artificial Noise Transmission Experimental
Setup
The experimental setup for AAN differs slightly from both transmit beam-
forming and RMN, and is shown in Figure 5.5. Like transmit beamforming,
only the two broadside elements are used. Each element receives the com-
bined output of two different phase shifters, where one phase shifter (∆Φsig)
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serves to direct the beam to the desired receiver and produce the QPSK sym-
bol, while the other phase shifter (∆Φint) produces the artificial noise that
falls in the nullspace of the channel to the desired receiver.
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Figure 5.5: Experimental setup for AAN transmission. The two broadside
elements transmit. Phase shifters ∆Φsig1 and ∆Φsig2 beamform to the
desired receiver and produce the QPSK symbols, while ∆Φint1 and ∆Φint2
produce artificial noise in the nullspace of the desired receiver’s channel.
The equations governing the phase shifts at each symbol time are as follows.
Like in the other two experimental cases, the desired receiver is the standard
gain horn 40◦ from the transmit array broadside. Let the channels from
elements B1 and B2 to the desired receiver be given by hB1 and hB2 . The
signal phase shifters are set to beamform to the desired receiver and add the
phase of the current message symbol m[k]:
∆Φsig1[k] = −∠hB1 + ∠m[k] (5.1)
∆Φsig2[k] = −∠hB2 + ∠m[k] (5.2)
The measured channel amplitudes are within 0.2 dB of each other, which
is crucial for generating the artificial noise part of AAN because there is only
phase control of the transmitting elements. The constraint on the artificial
noise is that it must add to zero at the desired receiver. This is equivalent
to randomly steering a beam at the symbol rate that always has a null in
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the direction of the desired receiver. The first of the two interference phase
shifters is free to take any value ∆Φint1
∆Φint1 = 2pir (5.3)
where r is a uniform random variable between zero and one. For no interfer-
ence in the desired direction, the second phase shifter must satisfy:
exp (j (hB1 + ∆Φint1)) + exp (j (hB2 + ∆Φint2)) = 0 (5.4)
because channels from both elements to the desired receiver are equal in
amplitude. Equation (5.4) is satisfied when the second phase shifter is set
to:
∆Φint2 = ∆Φint1 + ∠hB1 − ∠hB2 + pi (5.5)
Due to amplitude variations in the phase shifters, phase errors between the
set phase shift and the actual produced phase shift, and phase quantization,
the artificial noise is not exactly zero in the desired direction. But results in
Section 5.2 show the artificial noise at the desired receiver is low relative to
the signal power.
5.2 Fixed and Reconfigurable Array Performance
5.2.1 Received Constellations
This section describes the results of the transmission of data using either
ordinary transmit beamforming, AAN, or RMN. The message transmitted by
all three methods is a pseudo-random binary sequence (PN15). The desired
receiver was chosen to be 40◦ from array broadside, and the eavesdropper
locations to be measured were chosen to be 0◦ (broadside), 20◦, 30◦, 50◦,
and 60◦. Depending on the type of interference (AAN, RMN, or none), the
eavesdroppers will receive constellations that are distorted in different ways,
while the desired receiver should receive an ordinary QPSK constellation
regardless of the security method. Measured received constellations without
any added noise in postprocessing are shown in Figures 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8.
The received constellations from transmit beamforming shown in Figure
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Figure 5.6: Measured constellations at the desired receiver (40◦) and all
eavesdroppers. The constellation at 30◦ is slightly larger in amplitude than
the desired receiver’s constellation due to errors in the phase shifters that
distort the radiation pattern, as shown in Figure 5.4. Postprocessing noise
not added.
5.6 are simply scaled in amplitude and rotated due to the radiation pattern
from the transmit array and the differences in path phase when the transmit
array is rotated. The constellation amplitudes correspond to the measured
radiation pattern in Figure 5.4. Due to phase shifter errors, the pattern
maximum was closer to 30◦ than to the desired receiver at 40◦. Transmit
beamforming adds no physical layer encryption, and eavesdroppers only may
be thwarted by mathematical cryptographic methods or by a sufficiently low
SNR.
When the array transmits AAN as shown in Figure 5.7, the constella-
tions other than that of the desired receiver have interference in the form
of random deviations from the transmitted four QPSK constellation points.
Because the artificial noise is created by phase shifters instead of weights
with full amplitude and phase control, these deviations from the actual con-
stellation points are constant in amplitude and therefore form rings around
the points. Obviously, this is less secure than full amplitude and phase con-
trolled interference that would fill in the area around the constellations, but
there is ambiguity in the areas in which these rings intersect. This further
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Figure 5.7: Measured constellations when AAN is used to transmit the
data. The artificial noise distortion is limited to a nearly constant
magnitude circle around the constellation points because interference is
implemented with phase control only. Postprocessing noise not added.
complicates the eavesdroppers’ task of decoding the received signals in the
presence of AWGN.
The received constellations before added AWGN that are created by a
RMN scheme are shown in Figure 5.8. The pairs of broadside, endfire, or
mixed broadside and endfire element patterns all have the same amplitude
to the desired receiver when phases are chosen according to Table 5.1. This
is evident by the single QPSK constellation to 40◦. In other directions there
are as many as 16 distinct constellation points seen by the eavesdroppers,
due to the four QPSK points multiplied by the four different array pattern
configurations. The increased number of points are clustered closer together
and therefore are more easily confused in the presence of AWGN.
5.2.2 Secrecy Rates
Gaussian noise is added in postprocessing to mimic channels of various SNRs.
From these channels, secrecy can be compared between transmit beamform-
ing and no encryption scheme and using AAN or RMN encryption. Because
the received constellations at the desired receiver are all undistorted, the MI
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Figure 5.8: Measured constellations when RMN is used to transmit the
data. Eavesdroppers receive 16 constellation points because the four QPSK
symbols are multiplied by the four different array pattern configurations.
Postprocessing noise not added.
as a function of SNR should be the same regardless of the transmit scheme.
The MI is calculated according to Section 2.4.2 on the measured data with
added AWGN, and the resulting MIs are shown in Figure 5.9, verifying that
they are very similar. The assumption that the eavesdroppers know the bit
assignments of constellation points is more valid with the AAN transmitted
in this experiment than if the AAN had phase and amplitude control. It is
discernible simply from looking at the constellations distorted by AAN in
Figure 5.7 to which symbol most of the constellation points belong, though
ambiguities arise in the areas where two rings of interference intersect.
Because the constellations received by the eavesdroppers are very different
depending on the transmit method, MI as a function of Bob’s SNR varies. A
more meaningful way to analyze the secrecy performance is shown in Figure
5.10. It shows the minimum SNR required by each eavesdropper to success-
fully decode a signal when the communication rate from Alice to Bob is given
on the horizontal axis. In the case of transmit beamforming (TBF), a scaled
and rotated version of the same QPSK constellation is sent to all eavesdrop-
pers. As a function of SNR, scaling and rotating a QPSK constellation does
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Figure 5.9: MI vs. desired receiver SNR at the desired receiver when
AWGN is added in postprocessing. Because all constellations should have
no distortion or artificial noise, the MI is the same for all methods.
not lower the MI, and consequentially all received TBF constellations re-
quire the same minimum SNR for a given rate. The constellations produced
by AAN and RMN are distorted in other ways that will lower the MI for
a given SNR. Thus, eavesdroppers require a higher SNR to compensate for
this distortion.
In general, AAN seems to slightly outperform RMN from Figure 5.10.
Specific comparisons showing the secrecy rate between the desired receiver
and a single eavesdropper are shown in Figures 5.11 through 5.15. The
secrecy rate, which is the difference in MI between Bob and Eve, is shown
as a function of Bob’s SNR. The secrecy rate is equal to zero if Bob’s MI
is lower than Eve’s MI. When Bob has a very low SNR, Eve also will have
a very low SNR because the channels in this experiment are all LOS and
similar in strength. The MI of any signal at Bob or Eve is close to zero, and
therefore the secrecy rate is close to zero. Similarly, when Bob has a very
high SNR, any Eve also will have a high SNR, and the MI between Alice and
Bob or Eve will both be close to two bits, leading to a nearly zero secrecy
rate again.
Assuming the eavesdroppers have similarly strong channels to Alice as
Bob’s channel to Alice, Alice and Bob should communicate with a moderate
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Figure 5.10: The minimum SNR for each eavesdropper to be able to decode
the message as a function of the communication rate between Alice and
Bob. Eavesdroppers receiving AAN and RMN require a higher SNR than
TBF for the same rate because their constellations are distorted and thus
harder to decode in the presence of noise.
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Figure 5.11: The secrecy rate (difference in MI) between the desired
receiver and the eavesdropper at 0◦ for all three methods, as a function of
Bob’s SNR.
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Figure 5.12: The secrecy rate (difference in MI) between the desired
receiver and the eavesdropper at 20◦ for all three methods, as a function of
Bob’s SNR.
SNR in order to maximize their secrecy capacity. Figures 5.11 through 5.15
indicate that Alice should adjust her power so Bob has an SNR between
0 dB and 10 dB to maximize the secrecy rate. Even transmit beamforming
offers some secrecy capacity gains in this SNR regime due to Alice’s ability
to direct her radiation. It is in the 0 dB to 10 dB SNR regime that the MI
quickly climbs from nearly zero to nearly the maximum for both ordinary
constellations and constellations distorted by RMN or AAN. Equivalently,
Figure 5.10 shows that communicating with a rate from 1 to 2 bits per channel
use allows the largest spread, up to about 25 dB, between the minimum SNR
required by Bob to decode the message and the minimum required by an
eavesdropper receiving AAN or RMN.
In three of the figures in 5.11 through 5.15, AAN achieves the highest
secrecy capacity, and in the other two, RMN is the best. Whether RMN
or AAN are more secure toward a specific eavesdropper is a function of the
transmitted constellation. From Figures 5.7 and 5.8, the eavesdroppers for
which AAN yields a higher secrecy capacity tend to receive a more clustered
together constellation from AAN than RMN. When RMN yields a higher
secrecy capacity, the opposite is true.
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Figure 5.13: The secrecy rate (difference in MI) between the desired
receiver and the eavesdropper at 30◦ for all three methods, as a function of
Bob’s SNR.
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Figure 5.14: The secrecy rate (difference in MI) between the desired
receiver and the eavesdropper at 50◦ for all three methods, as a function of
Bob’s SNR.
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Figure 5.15: The secrecy rate (difference in MI) between the desired
receiver and the eavesdropper at 60◦ for all three methods, as a function of
Bob’s SNR.
5.3 Power Efficiency
Because of the limitations of using phase shifters instead of full amplitude
and phase control of weights, this experiment is not a good indicator of the
relative power efficiency of RMN and AAN in comparison to transmit beam-
forming. This is why all secrecy rate results were presented as a function of
SNR rather than using the received power. The transmit power going into
the phase shifters was the same for transmit beamforming, AAN, and RMN.
The power received at the desired receiver was 0.3 dB lower when transmit-
ting AAN than transmit beamforming. Adding artificial noise should not
change the signal in the desired transmit direction, which is why these two
received powers are very close. The received power when using RMN was
2.5 dB higher than transmit beamforming. This is due to the use of differ-
ent pairs of elements rather than only using the two broadside elements, as
well as different calculated phase shifts that direct the beam toward the de-
sired receiver. As mentioned earlier, due to errors in the actual phase shifts,
the main beam for transmit beamforming and AAN is closer to 30◦ rather
than the desired receiver at 40◦. RMN may appear more power efficient,
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but with ideal phase shifters and perfect measurement of the antenna radi-
ation patterns, transmit beamforming would be as power efficient as RMN.
AAN would ideally be half as power efficient because two of the four phase
shifters were used for artificial noise. But because these phase shifters were
turned off during transmit beamforming and RMN, the power going into
them was wasted. This is why AAN and transmit beamforming yielded the
same received power to the desired receiver with the same input power.
5.4 Conclusion
Even with the limited capabilities of the experimental setup, AAN and RMN
showed increased secrecy versus protecting unwanted reception by transmit
beamforming alone. When viewed in the context of eavesdropper SNR in
Figure 5.10, both RMN and AAN were more difficult for any eavesdroppers
to decode for a given SNR. This suggests a combination of the two methods
might perform even better than either alone. This is explored in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6
COMBINED RMN AND AAN
ENCRYPTION
The two main physical encryption techniques described here, AAN and RMN,
are complementary. AAN involves forming a constant fixed beam to the
desired receiver while randomly steering another beam that has a null to the
desired receiver. RMN involves maintaining constant power to the desired
receiver while randomly altering its antenna patterns among a finite number
of states. Thus, the communication to the desired receiver is accomplished in
the same way by both methods while the randomness in the channels seen by
eavesdroppers is accomplished by different means. An array of reconfigurable
elements can accomplish both AAN and RMN at the same time. Methods
and simulation results are given in this chapter.
6.1 Simulation Setup
The transmit array is a four-element array of beam-steering reconfigurable
elements shown in Figure 4.7. Two channel environments are tested: the
indoor apartment environment shown in Figure 4.1 and the urban Rosslyn
environment shown in Figure 4.4. The power allocation between signal and
artificial noise power for AAN was varied in the same way as in Chapter
4. Simulations were run with α equal to 1/11, 1/2, and 10/11, which cor-
responds to power ratios between artificial noise and signal of 10 dB, 0 dB,
and −10 dB, respectively. The same four low SNR and four medium SNR
receivers for each environment were used as the desired receivers.
For each symbol transmitted, random antenna radiation patterns were
chosen by the method specified for RMN in Section 3.2. Then, with the
channel to the desired receiver determined by the choice of antenna patterns,
AAN is generated by the method given in Section 2.1. For each antenna
pattern configuration, 1,000 artificial noise symbols are generated and the
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overall artificial noise power is determined by the averaging method discussed
in Section 2.5. This artificial noise power is added to the AWGN power,
which always is equal to one for all simulations. The final MI between the
transmitter and an eavesdropper is then calculated using this new noise power
in Equation (2.61).
The performance of this combined AANRMN scheme was compared to
transmit beamforming (TBF), AAN, and RMN. The transmit arrays for
TBF, AAN, and RMN also used the beam-steering element patterns shown
in Figure 4.7. For TBF and AAN, these antenna patterns were steered in
the best possible manner toward the desired receiver.
6.2 Simulation Results
The results of simulations for both channel environments are shown in Figures
6.1 and 6.2. The percentage of eavesdroppers able to decode the message is
again defined as the percentage of eavesdroppers that had MIs greater than
the MI to the desired receiver, for which the transmit power was adjusted so
this MI was 3.7 bits. The average transmit power in decibels is relative to
the transmit power of the fixed array when implementing ordinary transmit
beamforming.
The percent of eavesdroppers decoding the packets from TBF and AAN
transmitters falls on the same curves as a function of artificial noise. Initially,
the marginal benefits of adding artificial noise are great, as the percent of
eavesdroppers decoding falls dramatically between TBF, which has no arti-
ficial noise, and AAN with artificial noise with only −10 dB of the signal
power. As more artificial noise is added, the number of eavesdroppers able
to decode becomes close to zero in all cases, although a lot of noise power is
required.
The RMN encryption scheme tended to be less secure for the same transmit
power than AAN in most cases, although it offered more security in the case
of the indoor channel to the medium SNR receivers. The reason it was less
power efficient in the urban channel was that transmission through walls
was not allowed in the ray tracing calculation, so it was more important to
adjust the reconfigurable elements to their optimal beamsteering as steering
them away from the optimal directions required much higher compensatory
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Figure 6.1: Comparison of the secrecy vs. transmit power tradeoff for
various encryption schemes: AAN, RMN, and combined AANRMN. All
transmitters use the ideal beam-steering antenna elements of Figure 4.6
(with AAN and TBF patterns fixed and steered to the desired receiver).
Simulations are of the indoor environment to low SNR desired receivers
(top) and medium SNR desired receivers (bottom).
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of the secrecy vs. transmit power tradeoff for
various encryption schemes for the outdoor urban channel for low SNR
desired receivers (top) and medium SNR receivers (bottom).
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transmit power. Similarly in the low SNR indoor case, fixing the antenna
patterns in the optimal direction and generating artificial noise was the more
power-efficient scheme. Only when the SNRs to the desired receivers were
medium relative to the SNRs of potential eavesdroppers did it make sense to
distort the signal by reconfiguring antenna patterns.
In the AANRMN cases, with enough artificial noise, none of the eaves-
droppers were able to decode the packets. This is significant because some
eavesdroppers had SNRs 25 dB greater than Bob’s receive SNR in the indoor
environment and over 100 dB greater in the outdoor environment, even with
the transmitter array optimally desired toward Bob. It did not take nearly
this much artificial noise to cause the eavesdroppers to have worse channels
because the transmitted artificial noise and signal are sent through the same
strong channel to Eve.
The effect of using reconfigurable antennas in the transmit array as op-
posed to fixed antennas can also be seen in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. AAN alone
is able to reduce the amount of eavesdroppers receiving to about 1% or less
in all environments and receiver sets. However, AANRMN achieves the same
secrecy at lower transmit power. From the figures, AANRMN achieves this
level of eavesdropper reception with about 5 dB less transmit power. This is
because some of the distortion of the signal is caused by pattern reconfigu-
ration rather than artificial noise transmission.
6.3 Conclusion
The data in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show it is advantageous to combine additive
artificial noise with multiplicative noise induced by changing antenna element
patterns. The combined noise causes much lower MIs between the transmit-
ter and eavesdroppers than using either method alone, and both methods
can be used at the same time without any additional calculation than what
is required for both methods separately. In addition, the required transmit
power for a given fraction of eavesdroppers thwarted was almost always less
than either AAN or RMN alone.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 Summary
Additive artificial noise (AAN) has been experimentally tested and its perfor-
mance has been compared to other schemes using mutual information (MI).
An entirely different physical-layer encryption scheme called reconfigurable
multiplicative noise (RMN) that uses pattern-reconfigurable antennas has
been described. The two encryption schemes were then combined and the
secrecy and power efficiencies of all schemes were compared in indoor and
outdoor wireless channel simulations.
When adjusted for SNR, both AAN and RMN resulted in lower MI for all
eavesdroppers than using transmit beamforming (TBF) in the experimental
conditions described in Chapter 5. AAN has the advantages of using fixed
antennas and was slightly more secure overall due to transmitting artificial
noise. However, broadcasting artificial noise could be harmful if there are
friendly receivers in the area who also would be swamped by the noise. If
there are multiple friendly receivers, the AAN transmitter should keep track
of all of their channels and a more complicated calculation must be done
in order to broadcast noise only in the common nullspace of all friendly
receivers’ channels.
RMN can be more power efficient because it does not spend transmit
power on artificial noise, but it requires pattern-reconfigurable antennas and
its security performance cannot be incrementally adjusted by adding or sub-
tracting artificial noise. Additionally, RMN’s power efficiency is contingent
on how well the antenna patterns point in the direction of the desired re-
ceiver. If the antenna patterns are steered away from the desired receiver,
then more transmit power is needed in order to keep the same receive SNR.
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In simulations, AAN and RMN combined (AANRMN) was able to pre-
vent all eavesdroppers in indoor and outdoor environments from decoding a
message, even though some eavesdroppers had significantly better channels
to the transmitter than the desired receiver’s channel to the transmitter.
This means if the transmitter sends a message that is coded very near the
capacity of its channel to the desired receiver, it is highly unlikely that any
eavesdropper could decode a message because it would be impossible for the
eavesdropper to decode packets sent at a rate higher than its channel capac-
ity. All techniques are before any mathematical encryption and thus do not
incur the key-sharing overheads that lower the data rate.
7.2 Impact of Current Work
This work advances the state of the art in physical-layer encryption in several
ways:
• The AAN method proposed several years ago achieves the secrecy ca-
pacity bound derived in [16] for multiple transmit elements and single
element eavesdroppers and desired receiver. But previously, there ex-
isted no method to constrain peak power when transmitting AAN. This
work proposed modifications to AAN to constrain peak power with a
user-specified probabilistic rate of success. Because random Gaussian
noise is part of the transmitter weights, there is always some chance
that the total transmit power will exceed a peak power bound, in which
case the transmitter simply discards those weights and recalculates new
ones.
• The AAN method in the literature is also computationally intensive,
as it requires either repeated matrix inversions of the channel or a
singular value decomposition of the channel matrix. A new method
for fixed transmit elements called multiplicative artificial noise (MAN)
was proposed and shown to perform comparably to AAN in simulated
channels.
• Similar to MAN but using reconfigurable transmit elements, the recon-
figurable multiplicative noise (RMN) encryption uses the same compu-
tationally easy channel inversion calculation rather than a full channel
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matrix inversion. RMN adds increased secrecy because each transmit
element also randomly changes its radiation pattern at the symbol rate.
This was shown in experiment and simulations to perform slightly worse
than AAN overall. RMN’s benefit over AAN, besides computational
simplicity, is that it was shown in simulations to be more robust to
errors in the channel estimate to the desired receiver.
• Combining AAN and RMN into a single transmit encryption technique
(called AANRMN) allowed a high level of secrecy while using less trans-
mit power and thus lowering the noise floor for other friendly receivers
in the vicinity of the transmitter. In simulations and when using enough
artificial noise power, AANRMN was able to force all eavesdroppers to
a lower mutual information than the desired receiver, even though the
locations of eavesdroppers were unknown to the transmitter and some
eavesdroppers had much stronger channels than the desired receiver
due to their proximity to the transmitter.
• A method for comparing encryption techniques using mutual informa-
tion was devised. Previous work ([28, 29, 30]) with spatially varying
signals assumed any constellation in which at least one point was suf-
ficiently distorted would be undecodable, but this is incorrect. While
[16] derives the secrecy rate for AAN, many other techniques such as
MAN and RMN have no possible closed-form expression for the secrecy
rate. But the mutual information between the transmit array and all
receivers can be calculated from the received constellation regardless
of the technique. Hence, any physical-layer encryption technique can
be evaluated in this manner, although it may require averaging over
receivers and eavesdroppers with many different channel realizations.
• Simplified forms of AAN and RMN are generated experimentally for
the first time and their relative secrecy rates compared. AAN was
slightly more secure than RMN in this scenario, and both were more
secure than transmit beamforming.
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7.3 Future Work
Before the benefits of RMN or combined AANRMN can be realized, pattern-
reconfigurable antennas must be designed that are more easily fabricated.
Current designs that have switches connected to the radiating elements use
bias networks that must be electromagnetically isolated lest they also radiate.
Because of the difficulty of fabrication, antennas hardwired to one radiation
pattern were used in the experiment in the work done here. In order to
become widely adopted, pattern-reconfigurable antennas should be designed
that are easier to mass-produce and have a large tolerance for fabrication er-
ror, while not being too complex or expensive so that a phased-array becomes
a better option. One option is to use electrically steerable passive array radi-
ators (ESPARs) as the radiating elements, since these have a longer history
of being reliably produced. However, the inter-element coupling of ESPARs
may be harder to control and large inter-element is spacing required.
One important tradeoff of any artificial noise scheme is between secrecy
and an increased noise floor for the entire wireless network. If many trans-
mitters are radiating artificial noise, the result will be that the noise floor
is raised for all receivers, whether they are eavesdroppers or attempting to
communicate with another party entirely. Spread-spectrum networks suffer a
similar problem. Because transmitted signals are spread over the entire band-
width, they add to the noise floor of all receivers. However, spread-spectrum
offers similar secrecy in that it is difficult to decode a spread-spectrum signal
without knowledge of the spreading sequence. The secrecy and noise power
of AAN should be compared to spread-spectrum signaling methods. It is
also possible to combine the spread-spectrum signaling with artificial noise.
This work used QPSK or 16 QAM modulation as the signaling type but a
spread-spectrum signal could have carried the message, and artificial noise
could be added without changing the algorithms described here.
Finally, this work has been concerned with eavesdroppers and desired re-
ceivers using a single antenna element. Theoretical bounds have been derived
in [17] for collaborating eavesdroppers or those with multiple antennas, but
implementable encryption techniques that take multiple receive antennas into
account have not yet been developed. In fact, when using multiple receive
antennas for the desired receiver and eavesdropper, it was shown that the
secrecy rate of AAN is significantly lower than the secrecy capacity bound
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derived in [17]. Future methods could look to relax the constraint that no
amount of artificial noise should be transmitted to the desired receiver. If the
desired receiver has multiple antennas, then it may be able to filter out some
amount of artificial noise. Thus, new physical-layer encryption techniques
should be developed for multiple receive and eavesdropper antenna elements.
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APPENDIX A
DIRECTIONAL MODULATION
This appendix presents a physical layer encryption method called directional
modulation (DM) that is a subset of additive artificial noise (AAN). Sec-
tions A.1 and A.2 are adapted from [35] and Section A.3 is adapted from
[36]. DM is similar to AAN because the transmitted signal constellation is
distorted to any eavesdropper with a different channel than the desired re-
ceiver, while the desired receiver sees a normal constellation. However, while
AAN sends a new randomly generated constellation point each symbol time
to an eavesdropper, DM switches between a fixed number of constellation
points. The secrecy comes from the fact that a subset of these constellation
points tend to be very close together, making it difficult for an eavesdropper
to distinguish among them in the presence of external noise. The calculation
of array weights for DM uses a genetic algorithm instead of the closed-form
expressions used in AAN for putting noise in the nullspace of the desired
receiver. This calculation is explained first, followed by simulated and mea-
sured results.
A.1 Array Weight Calculation via a Genetic Algorithm
Figure A.1 shows a simplified block diagram of a traditional phased array
and an array using DM. In the traditional array, the digital modulation is
produced in baseband, mixed with the carrier frequency, and sent out through
progressively phased elements. In the case of DM, the phase shifters actually
create the modulation by changing phase of a single tone. The amplitude
or phase shifts constituting a digital modulation are created by the phase
shifters, rather than a baseband block, which is why the signal is directional
and appears distorted in undesired directions.
An efficient optimization algorithm for DM to determine the phase shifts
88
Information
Baseband 
Modulation
f
c
∆Φ
∆Φ
∆Φ
Information
f
c
∆Φ
∆Φ
∆Φ
Figure A.1: Traditional array transmitter (left) and DM transmitter (right).
necessary to implement a digital modulation is presented. A GA was chosen
for this application because GAs have been used numerous times for array
pattern synthesis, including nulling [54] and sidelobe reduction [55, 56]. The
optimization cost function presented in Section A.1.2 is not convex, and there
exists no method to obtain a globally optimal solution. A GA can give a good
solution quickly, albeit saying nothing about optimality. In this section, we
assemble basic beamforming equations in a format that allows direct use by
GAs. This formulation also helps provide a clear linkage between radiation
pattern synthesis and digital symbol synthesis. From [57], we can express
the radiation pattern of an arbitrarily-spaced three-dimensional array of N
elements at time t as
E(θ, φ, t) =
N∑
n=1
fn(θ, φ)e
jk·rnsn(t) (A.1)
where fn(θ, φ) is the active element pattern of element n, and
k · rn = 2pi
λ
(xn sin(θ) cos(φ) + yn sin(θ) sin(φ) + zn cos(θ)) (A.2)
where (xn, yn, zn) is the location of element n and λ is the wavelength at
the carrier frequency. The term sn(t) is the excitation of element n at time
t; it is a continuous wave (CW) signal phase-shifted appropriately for each
element and whose phase changes at the symbol rate. How the active element
patterns are found is described next.
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A.1.1 Active Element Patterns
The antenna array measured for all calculations in this appendix is a four-
element linear array of microstrip patches, shown in Figure A.2. The operat-
ing frequency is 7 GHz, and all elements are spaced one-half of a wavelength
apart. At the operating frequency, the return loss of all elements is greater
than 12 dB. All patterns are taken in the azimuthal plane (xy) and E-plane
(zˆ) polarization is used with the plane of the array in the yz plane.
λ/2 φ
z
y
x
1 2 3 4
Figure A.2: Four-element linear patch array transmitting at 7 GHz.
The active element pattern (or scan element pattern) is the radiation pat-
tern of a single element when it is located in an array [58, 59]. It is different
from the isolated element pattern due to mutual coupling between array el-
ements and surface wave loss, and it is necessary to include these effects so
that digital modulation magnitudes and phases are precise. One can mea-
sure the active element pattern of an element by terminating all other array
elements in 50 Ω. Because Maxwell’s equations are linear, the total radia-
tion pattern of the array is the superposition of the active element patterns
[57]. This is confirmed in Figure A.3, in which the radiation pattern when
all elements are uniformly driven is compared to the summation of the four
active element patterns, for azimuthal angles (φ) from −90◦ to +90◦ corre-
sponding to the half plane in front of the array. As expected, there is good
agreement, meaning that the active element patterns can be used for precise
calculations.
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Figure A.3: Normalized magnitude and phase of the measured radiation
pattern when all elements are driven (together) and the pattern predicted
by the summation of the active element patterns (separate).
A.1.2 GA Optimization for BER
The independent variables in the optimization are the phase shifts at each
of the four elements, denoted as γi for the i
th element. Thus, the excitations
are forced have magnitude equal to one by
si(t) = exp (jγi(t)) (A.3)
In the GA, members of the population are sets of four phase angles γ, one
for each element. The population size was set to four, with children formed
from random crossover of the two best members.
Let L be the set of directions in which low BER is desired, H be the set of
directions in which high BER is desired, wi and wj be weights chosen based
on the importance of the BER in certain directions, and (θi, φi) and (θj, φj)
represent transmit directions. The cost function is given as follows:
Cost =
∑
i∈L
wi · BER(θi, φi)−
∑
j∈H
wj · BER(θj, φj) (A.4)
The BER is a function of the noise power (assumed to be equal in all direc-
tions) and the received constellation, assuming both the desired receivers and
eavesdroppers have perfect knowledge of the channel and thus also knowledge
of the received constellation diagrams.
How BER is calculated is described next. DM creates arbitrary four-point
(4-ary) constellations rather than square QPSK constellations. Because the
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BERs of these constellations must be repeatedly calculated as part of the
GA, it is desirable to have a closed-form expression of BER. While methods
have been found to determine closed-form expressions for arbitrary constella-
tions [60, 61, 62], these methods are complicated and instead a simple bound
similar to the nearest-neighbor approximation [39] is used. The nearest-
neighbor approximation states that the probability of symbol error can be
approximated by the distance of the two closest constellation points
Perror = Q
(
d/2√
N0/2
)
(A.5)
where d is the Euclidean distance between the two closest constellation
points, N0/2 is the noise power spectral density, and Q(x) is the comple-
mentary Gaussian error function. More precisely, d for the constellation
transmitted in direction k is computed as:
min
i,j,i6=j
|E(θk, φk, t)i − E(θk, φk, t)j| (A.6)
where E(θk, φk, t)i is the transmitted radiation pattern in direction k for the
constellation symbol i. This assumes there is only one closest point or one
nearest neighbor to each point, which is a valid assumption for the 4-ary
constellations considered here. Next, the bound can be made more precise
by considering the probability of symbol error of each constellation point
separately. Let di be the minimum Euclidean distance from point i to any
other point in that constellation. Assuming all four constellation points are
equally likely, the probability of symbol error is given by
Perror =
1
4
4∑
i=1
Q
(
di/2√
N0/2
)
(A.7)
Finally, by Gray coding, we can approximate the probability of bit error as
half the probability of symbol error for a 4-ary constellation [39]. The final
expression for a lower bound on BER is given by
Pb(error) =
1
8
4∑
i=1
Q
(
di/2√
N0/2
)
(A.8)
This expression was used in the GA to evaluate the cost function in Equation
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(A.4). It will be shown in Sections A.2.1 and A.2.2 that this bound closely
predicts the simulated BERs.
A.2 Phased Array DM Simulations
Simulations based on the measured element patterns and the phase shifts
from the GA are given next. It is shown that DM can achieve a low BER in
a narrow beamwidth toward a desired receiver and still enforce a high BER
in other directions.
A.2.1 Secure Communication to Broadside
The GA was used to find phase shifts that give a low BER in a 10◦ beamwidth
around broadside and a high BER to all other angles in the half-plane from
−90◦ to +90◦. The resulting BERs given by the lower bound in Equation
(A.8) and by simulation are shown in Figure A.4. In simulations, up to
2 × 108 random bits were transmitted per angle (1◦ increments) and white
Gaussian noise was added to the signal. There is good agreement with the
lower bound in (A.8) and simulation.
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Figure A.4: BER when desired receiver is at broadside for the traditional
array (Trad.), the DM array lower bound (LB), and DM simulated BER
(sim).
Also shown in Figure A.4 is the BER from a traditional array transmitter
phased to broadside. This BER is a function of amplitude of the radiation
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pattern. The expression for the probability of bit error for a QPSK modula-
tion is given by [63]:
Pb(error) = Q
(√
Eb
N0/2
)
(A.9)
The energy per bit in QPSK, Eb, is equal to half the symbol energy, Es.
Es is found by taking the square magnitude of the radiation pattern in the
direction of interest. The largest magnitude radiation pattern at broadside is
produced by the traditional transmitter when all four elements are in phase.
This creates a much lower BER at broadside for the traditional array than
for the DM array. In order to fairly compare the BER levels in the sidelobe
regions, the power of the traditional array was reduced until the BER was
the same at broadside as the DM array, while the noise power is kept the
same for both transmitters. This means the traditional array achieves the
same low BER toward the desired receiver as the DM array, without spending
more power than necessary, which would increase sidelobe power as well as
mainlobe power. In this manner, the security in the undesired directions
can be compared while the arrays have the same performance in the desired
direction. The broadside radiation pattern of the traditional transmitter is
shown in Figure A.5, along with radiation patterns created by the four sets
of phases of the DM transmitter.
The traditional array and the DM array have the same order of magnitude
of BER in the directions away from broadside, but the DM array has a
narrower beamwidth in which the BER becomes very low. Thus, at some
angles such as ±10◦, the BER of the DM array is several orders of magnitude
higher than the BER of the traditional transmitter. While a uniformly fed
array has the narrowest possible pattern beamwidth, the DM transmitter
has a narrower BER beamwidth because it has greater capability to alter
constellations.
The spatial variability of DM is evident when comparing received constel-
lations at −50◦. Both arrays achieve about the same high BER (0.2) in this
direction. But the signal magnitude of the traditional array in this direction
is clearly lower than several of the DM constellation point magnitudes by
as much as 13 dB, as can be seen in Figure A.5. Yet, even with this larger
signal power, the DM array still manages to keep the BER high. The reason
for this can be seen from Figure A.6. The two DM points that have large
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Figure A.5: Normalized radiation patterns when phased to give low BER
toward broadside and high BER everywhere else. DM 1 through DM 4 are
the radiation patterns when the four different DM constellation points are
sent. Also shown is the relative magnitude of the radiation pattern of the
traditional array (all elements in-phase) to achieve the same BER toward
broadside.
magnitudes also are very close together in phase, while the other two points
have very small magnitudes. Thus, it is difficult for a receiver to distinguish
between either pair of points in the presence of noise. The traditional array
is able to achieve a low signal magnitude in this direction, but the constel-
lation is still separated as much as possible given that amplitude, providing
an opportunity for undesired eavesdropping.
A.2.2 Secure Communication to −45◦
DM also has advantages over a traditional array when steered away from
broadside. Figure A.7 shows the radiation patterns for both transmitters
when the desired receiver is at −45◦ from broadside. The traditional array
faces the effects of broadening of the mainlobe and higher sidelobe levels
when it is steered away from broadside.
These effects manifest themselves in the BER of the traditional transmit-
ter, shown in Figure A.8. Compared to the DM array, the traditional array
has a wider BER beamwidth around the desired direction and the sidelobes
cause regions of lower BER in undesired directions. The DM BER has the
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Figure A.6: Constellation diagrams at −50◦ from broadside for the
traditional array and the DM array. While the magnitude of the traditional
array’s constellation is decreased, it is still able to be decoded, while the
DM constellation is, in essence, scrambled.
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Figure A.7: Normalized radiation patterns when phased to give low BER
toward −45◦ and high BER everywhere else. DM 1 through DM 4 are the
resulting radiation patterns when the four different DM constellation points
are sent. Also shown is the relative magnitude of the radiation pattern of
the traditional array (phased to −45◦) to achieve the same BER toward
−45◦.
same narrow beamwidth over which lower BER is transmitted as in Figure
A.4. It also smooths out sidelobes, displaying a relatively constant high BER
in the undesired transmission directions.
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Figure A.8: BER when desired receiver is at −45◦ shown for traditional
array (Trad.), the lower bound of the DM array (LB) and DM simulated
BER (Sim).
A.3 Experimental Results
To measure the performance of DM versus baseband modulation, three exper-
iments are conducted for each transmitter where a desired receiver is located
in a LOS channel at broadside, −30◦, and +20◦, relative to the transmit
array. Eavesdropping receivers may be located in any other direction besides
that of the desired receiver, and their locations are not known to the trans-
mitter. The transmit array is the microstrip patch antenna array described
in Section A.1.1. The receive antenna is a standard gain horn oriented to
receive the dominant polarization of the microstrip patch array.
A.3.1 Traditional Baseband Array Setup
The experimental procedure of the traditional phased array transmitter will
be explained first. A block diagram of the entire arrangement is shown in
Figure A.9. The first step for the traditional phased array is to calculate
the necessary phase shifts to steer toward the three receiver directions. The
calculated phase shifts are stored in a computer located inside an anechoic
chamber along with the transmit and receive antennas, and four five-bit
Miteq digital phase shifters [64]. The phase shifters are actually six-bit, but
the number of analog outputs from the computer limits the amount of control
bits to five. The phase shifts were calculated assuming isotropic element pat-
terns. Thus, some beamforming error is introduced because the microstrip
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patch patterns are not entirely constant over the angles of interest, while
other error is due to the quantization of the phase shifts. Still, the measured
patterns when phased to the three desired directions all have mainlobes of
approximately the same magnitude, shown in Figure A.10. Since the main-
lobes steered off of broadside are not significantly lower than the mainlobe
when all phase shifters are set to 0◦, this suggests the phasing is close to
ideal. One other source of error is the presence of a computer inside the
anechoic chamber, which slightly distorts the patterns, causing one of the
sidelobes in the broadside pattern in Figure A.10 to be about 5 dB higher
than the other.
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Figure A.9: Experimental configuration of the traditional phased array
transmitter and receiver.
The baseband digital modulation is generated by an Agilent E4438C vec-
tor signal generator. A pseudorandom binary sequence (PN15) is sent by
the traditional and DM transmitters [65]. These information bits are used
to create Gray-coded QPSK modulation with a bit rate of 200 kbps that is
passed through a root-raised-cosine filter. The vector signal generator upcon-
verts the modulation to an intermediate frequency (IF) of 500 MHz, and it is
then externally mixed to 7 GHz. The RF signal is amplified by a broadband
amplifier with 21 dB gain and then passes through a four-way power divider
before passing through the phase shifters and finally, the antenna array.
After reception by a standard gain horn, root-raised-cosine bandpass fil-
tering, downconversion to baseband, and digital sampling are accomplished
by an Agilent E4440A spectrum analyzer. Artificial AWGN noise is added
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Figure A.10: Normalized measured patterns when the transmit array is
steered to broadside, −30◦ from broadside, and +20◦ from broadside.
to achieve a desired SNR. This noise is complex because the filter has been
bandpass filtered and downconverted to baseband. The signal plus noise is
demodulated in Matlab [66]. A 10 MHz reference signal between the local
oscillator (LO) and the spectrum analyzer makes a phase lock loop (PLL)
unnecessary.
A.3.2 Directional Modulation Array Setup
The arrangement of the DM transmitter, shown in Figure A.11, differs from
the traditional transmitter because the modulation is now synthesized in the
RF portion. The signal sent into the phase shifters is a sinusoid at the array
operating frequency. The signal leaving the phase shifters is modulated due to
the fast, repeated changes of the phase shifters, and these modulated signals
are not simply delayed copies of each other. Rather, the signals leaving the
phase shifters are modulated such that they combine in the far-field to create
the desired 4-ary modulation only in the desired direction [35].
Instead of calculating a single set of phase shifts, a set is calculated for each
digital symbol (in this case, four). This requires knowledge of the active
element patterns, which are measured beforehand. The GA from Section
A.1.2 calculates the four sets of phase shifts based on the active element
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patterns. The cost function has been altered to:
Cost =
BER(desired direction)
min(BER(undesired directions))
(A.10)
because then weights on the BER for each direction do not have to be as-
signed, as they did in (A.4), eliminating one source of uncertainty about the
design.
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Figure A.11: Experimental configuration of the traditional phased array
transmitter and receiver.
There is a “don’t care” region of 5◦ on either side of the desired direction
that is not part of the “undesired directions” in Equation (A.10) because it
is a transition region from low to high BERs. The solutions from the GA
are also restricted to those that are possible to be produced by the quantized
five-bit phase shifters. In order to increase accuracy, the actual phase shifts of
the phase shifters were measured and used in the GA. For example, switching
the most significant bit in one of the phase shifters produces a 175.3◦ shift
instead of 180◦. As a final step in the GA, the sets of phase shifts were
assigned to the four symbols based on Gray coding. Table A.1 shows the set
of phase shifts used for communication toward broadside.
After the phase shifts are calculated, they are used to construct a text file
that governs the real-time switching of the phase shifters. For each symbol
consisting of two bits of the pseudorandom binary sequence, control voltages
are recorded to produce the corresponding phase shifts for that symbol. Two
periods of the binary sequence (32767 symbols) are loaded into a computer
containing analog control voltages for the five bits of each phase shifter. The
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Table A.1: Set of phase shifts for DM to produce four symbols when the
desired receiver is at broadside from the transmit array.
Symbol Elem. 1 Elem. 2 Elem. 3 Elem. 4
“00” −143◦ −146◦ −145◦ 86◦
“01” −79◦ −91◦ −74◦ −77◦
“10” 96◦ 94◦ 121◦ 102◦
“11” 42◦ −44◦ −44◦ 78◦
computer repeatedly reads through the entire sequence changing the phase
shift control bits at a rate of 100k Symbols/sec, yielding a bit rate of 200 kbps.
The receiver for DM is nearly the same as the receiver for traditional QPSK
modulation. A normal bandpass filter is used instead of a root-raised-cosine
filter, because no pulse shaping is done on transmit. The transmitted CW
signal still shares a common reference with the downconverter in the receiver,
so a phase lock loop is not needed. However, the symbol timing in the DM
transmitter is now regulated by the computer controlling the phase shifters,
which does not share a common reference with the receiver’s sampling clock.
Therefore, the received signal is oversampled by a factor of four above the
symbol rate and a delay lock loop is implemented to determine the best
sampling points.
The bit rate is limited by the speed of the computer producing the analog
outputs, since it must produce outputs for twenty control bits each time two
bits are transmitted. The switching speed of the phase shifters is actually
much faster, on the order of nanoseconds [64]. The transient effects of switch-
ing a phase shifter are shown in Figure A.12. Here, a single phase shifter is
connected between a signal generator operating at 7 GHz and the receiver by
a wire. The most significant bit (0◦ to 180◦) is repeatedly changed at a rate
of 100 kHz. The receiver then downconverts the signal and creates complex
baseband samples. Ten periods of switching (100 µs) are shown in Figure
A.12. It takes about half of the symbol period for the phase shifter to transi-
tion, and therefore oversampling by a factor of four guarantees that at least
one sample should occur when the transmitted symbol has reached steady
state. The discontinuous parts of the curves are likely due to a disallowed
bias voltage. When the bias voltage transitions between 0 V and −5 V, there
is a point around −2.5 V where both the 0◦ and 180◦ modes in the phase
shifter are off. This point in the middle of the two bias voltages is what we
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call the disallowed bias voltage. At this point, the phase shifter’s insertion
loss increases by about 20 dB, suppressing the signal.
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Figure A.12: Measured downconverted output of a phase shifter fed with a
7 GHz CW signal and switched between 0◦ to 180◦ at a rate of 100 kHz.
A.3.3 BER Measurement Results from DM and QPSK
Signals
In the anechoic chamber, the antenna array for both transmitters was ro-
tated from −50◦ to +50◦ while the receiver horn antenna was stationary, to
simulate receivers at these directions. Between 1.9 × 106 and 2.0 × 106 bits
were sent at each direction in 10◦ increments and AWGN was added with a
noise power of −52 dBm over the frequencies of interest to achieve an SNR
of 12 dB in the desired direction. In comparison, the received signals have
received power less than −40 dBm. The input power for both transmitters
was −7.5 dBm, split equally to each antenna.
Figure A.13(a) shows the BERs of a desired receiver at broadside and other
eavesdropping receivers from −50◦ to +50◦. Also shown are predicted BER
curves based on measured radiation patterns. The predicted BER for the
DM transmitter is a lower bound calculated from the GA using the active
element patterns [35]. The predicted BER for the traditional transmitter is
calculated using the measured pattern data from Figure A.10. The relation
between the radiation pattern power and BER for QPSK is given in [35]. The
predicted BER for the traditional transmitter agrees well with the measured
BER, and the measured BER of the DM transmitter is always slightly above
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its calculated lower bound. The close agreement between BERs estimated
from radiation patterns and the BERs measured from transmitting a digital
modulation is important because it means performance can be accurately
assessed when designing a DM transmitter (for example, using the GA in
[35], given measured or simulated radiation patterns).
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Figure A.13: (a): Measured BERs when both transmitters are directed to
broadside. Also shown is the predicted BER of the traditional transmitter
based on the measured radiation pattern and the predicted lower bound of
the BER of DM based on the measured active element patterns. (b): The
noise power in the DM case is decreased by 0.6 dB so that both transmitters
achieve the same BER toward the desired receiver at broadside.
One important feature in Figure A.13(a) is that the BER of the traditional
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transmitter in the desired direction is less than the BER of the DM transmit-
ter. This is to be expected because the phased array maximizes the power
in the broadside direction as its sole priority. On the other hand, the DM
transmitter trades some of the power transmitted in the desired direction for
a narrower region of low BERs and high BERs in all other directions. This
also is evident in Figure A.13(a) in the 20◦ region around broadside where
the BER of an eavesdropper is sometimes an order of magnitude lower if the
traditional array is transmitting compared to the DM array.
However, in order to fairly compare the narrowness of the BER regions,
the BER in the direction of the desired receiver should be equal for both
the DM and traditional transmitters. In the case of the desired receiver at
broadside, this is accomplished by raising the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
of the DM transmitter 0.6 dB (by lowering the added noise power after
signal reception), which lowers the BER in all directions. This new BER
curve is shown in Figure A.13(b) along with the same measured BERs of
the traditional array from Figure A.13(a). The DM transmitter is able to
transmit a low BER in a narrower region than the traditional transmitter,
confirming the results first calculated in [35].
The reason the DM transmitter produces a narrower low BER region can
be found from the received power and the received constellations. Figure
A.14 shows the average received symbol power calculated from the radiation
pattern of the traditional transmitter and the active element patterns of
the DM transmitter. This received symbol power was used to calculate the
predicted BER curves in Figure A.13(a). Because all constellation points
have the same magnitude in the traditional array with QPSK, the average
symbol power equals the instantaneous symbol power. On the other hand, the
DM array creates arbitrary constellations with different power for different
symbols, so average symbol power is used to compare the two methods.
Toward the desired receiver at broadside, the two transmitters send about
the same power (after increasing the DM transmitter power by 0.6 dB). But
off broadside, the DM array tends to send more power than the traditional
array. Yet, the measured BERs are either lower for the DM array or about
the same as the traditional array. The reason for this can be gleaned from
the received constellation. For example, the first 200 received constellation
points that would be seen by an eavesdropper at +50◦ when the DM and
traditional transmitters are intending to transmit to 0◦ is shown in Figure
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Figure A.14: Average received symbol power by both transmitters when
directed toward broadside.
A.15. From Figure A.14, the symbol power calculated from radiation patterns
is 7.7 dB higher at +50◦ for the DM array than the traditional array. The
BER measured at +50◦ was approximately the same for both transmitters
(0.20 for the traditional array and 0.16 for the DM array). The reason
the DM array achieves this same high BER toward the eavesdropper while
transmitting at a higher power level is evident from the constellation diagram.
Three of the constellation points are grouped close together, even though they
are far from the origin. This indicates three signals with higher power that
look approximately the same, and thus are difficult to demodulate correctly.
The traditional baseband constellations are the same shape regardless of
where the receiver is located, so the only way to increase BER and reduce
the chance of demodulation by an eavesdropper is to reduce the power of each
symbol, or equivalently reduce the sidelobe level in the radiation pattern.
Figures A.16 and A.17(a) show the predicted and measured BER when
the desired receiver is at −30◦ and +20◦, respectively. These figures have
the same characteristics as Figure A.13(a). The low BER region is narrower
for the DM transmitter than the traditional transmitter, while the BERs are
approximately equal between the two transmitters in the sidelobe region. In
the case when the desired receiver is at −30◦, both transmitters produce the
same BER at −30◦ with equal input power, because the traditional array’s
maximum of the radiation pattern occurs at −26◦ rather than −30◦.
In the case when the desired receiver is at +20◦ from array broadside,
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Figure A.15: Received constellations from both transmitters by an
eavesdropping receiver at +50◦ when both transmitters directed toward
broadside.
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Figure A.16: Measured BERs when both transmitters are directed to
−30◦. Also shown is the predicted BER of the traditional transmitter based
on the measured radiation pattern and the predicted lower bound of the
BER of DM based on the measured active element patterns.
the DM transmitter produced the same BER as the traditional transmitter
toward +20◦ when the SNR of the DM transmitter was increased by 0.1 dB,
shown in Figure A.17(b). The region of low BER once again is narrower for
the DM transmitter.
This section has presented the first experimental demonstration of direc-
tional modulation by transmitting data in real time. The measurements
indicate that a DM transmitter manipulates a direction-dependent signal so
that it is harder to decode in more undesired directions. In addition, the
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Figure A.17: (a): Measured BERs when both transmitters are directed to
+20◦. Also shown is the predicted BER of the traditional transmitter based
on the measured radiation pattern and the predicted lower bound of the
BER of DM based on the measured active element patterns. (b): The noise
power in the DM case is decreased by 0.1 dB so that both transmitters
achieve the same BER toward the desired receiver at broadside.
DM array sends a signal that will be decoded by the desired receiver with
the same low BER (with some small increase in transmit power possibly
necessary) with no additional work needed by the receiver.
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